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FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Amy Sinden *
Abstract
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is usually treated as a monolith. In fact,
the term can refer to a broad variety of decisionmaking practices, ranging
from a qualitative comparison of pros and cons to a highly formalized and
technical method grounded in economic theory that monetizes both costs
and benefits, discounts to present net value, and locates the point at which
the marginal benefits curve crosses the marginal costs curve. This article
develops a typology that helps to conceptualize the multiple varieties of
CBA along a formality-informality spectrum. It then uses this typology to
analyze the treatment of CBA by the academic community and the three
branches of the federal government. In academic and policy circles, the
formal end of this spectrum generates far more controversy than the
informal end. Additionally, the law (federal environmental statutes and
case law) seems to favor informal over formal varieties of CBA.
Nonetheless, the executive branch appears to be moving toward the formal
end of the spectrum. Executive Orders and guidance documents direct
agencies to conduct a highly formal mode of CBA. And anecdotal evidence
suggests that agencies often go out of their way to give their CBAs the
trappings of formality, sometimes in ways that lead to irrational results. I
argue that 1) failing to distinguish between formal and informal CBA, and
the many varieties in between, has led to muddled thinking and to misuses
of CBA; and 2) the trend toward formality in the executive branch is out
of step with Congress and the courts and may be counterproductive,
where, for example, it leads to what I call “false formality”—a corruption
of CBA that can occur when agencies fail to clearly and consistently define
where on the formality-informality spectrum a particular CBA falls.
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[M]y way is to divide half a sheet of paper
by a line into two columns; writing over the
one Pro, and over the other Con. Then,
during three or four days consideration, I
put down under the different heads short
hints of the different motives, that at different
times occur to me, for or against the
measure. When I have thus got them all
together in one view, I endeavor to estimate
their respective weights . . . . And, though the
weight of reasons cannot be taken with the
precision of algebraic quantities, yet when
each is thus considered, separately and
comparatively, and the whole lies before me,
I think I can judge better, and am less liable
to take a rash step, and in fact I have found
great advantage from this kind of equation,
in what may be called moral or prudential
algebra.
Letter from Benjamin
Franklin to Joseph
Priestley (Sept. 19,
1772) 1
I. INTRODUCTION
A debate has been raging for decades over whether to use cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) in evaluating government regulation. 2 But the participants in this debate have

1

EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1 (2d ed. 1990).
For some early arguments in favor of CBA, see, for example, E. J. MISHAN, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 390 (1976); A. R. Prest & R. Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey,
75 ECON. J. 683, 683–85 (1965). For some early critiques, see, for example, ARTHUR
SMITHIES, THE BUDGETARY PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 344–46 (1955); Robert
Dorfman, Forty Years of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in ECONOMETRIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO
PUBLIC POLICY 268 (Richard Stone & William Peterson eds. 1978).
At least in the environmental arena, Congress has largely rejected CBA as a
decisionmaking tool, instead directing the agencies to set standards using other criteria, like
feasibility or the protection of public health. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H.
Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 433 (2008); Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in
the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129
(2004) [hereinafter Sinden, Endangered Species]. But beginning with President Ronald
Reagan, every president has imposed, through executive order, a requirement on federal
2
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not always been careful about defining terms. What, after all, do we mean by “costbenefit analysis”? The term can be used to describe a broad range of practices. On
one end of the spectrum is a Ben Franklin-style listing of qualitatively described
pros and cons. On the other end is a highly technical and formal analytic method
grounded in economic theory that attempts to fully quantify and monetize all of the
social costs and benefits of a whole range of regulatory options and then, by
calculating the point at which the marginal benefits curve intersects the marginal
costs curve, identify the economically efficient level of regulation. And between
these two extremes lie yet more varieties of CBA.
The two ends of this spectrum actually have very little in common, other than
the general approach of juxtaposing positive and negative impacts. Informal CBA
relies on qualitative descriptions intuitively compared and gives no more than
general guidance. The most formal varieties of CBA, on the other hand, rely on
numbers and mathematics and purport, at least, to provide precise answers.
Moreover, the two techniques play entirely different roles in the decisionmaking
process. Informal CBA provides no more than a secondary check on a decision that
has been made by other means, while formal CBA provides, at least in theory, a
standard-setting tool for identifying the optimal choice from among a whole range
of regulatory alternatives.
Despite this broad range of meanings, scholars and policymakers often use the
term “cost-benefit analysis” (or “benefit-cost analysis”), 3 without adjectives or
qualifiers, as though it were a monolithic concept. This failure to distinguish

agencies to conduct CBA on all major rules, even when the statute does not allow the agency
to make its decision on that basis. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92
(2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
102–03 (2012); see infra notes 215 to 217 and accompanying text. As a result, agency use
of CBA has increased over the past three decades. Nonetheless, debate continues over
whether CBA makes regulation more rational or simply provides increased leverage for
powerful industry stakeholders to downplay the benefits of regulation and manipulate agency
decision making toward less stringency. Compare RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A.
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER
PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 13–16 (2008) and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 19–20 (2002) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE] and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 99, 120–23 (2002) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON] and
John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 395, 429, 432–38 (2008) with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) and Amy Sinden,
In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 1405, 1410, 1452–60 (2005) [hereinafter Sinden, Defense of Absolutes].
3
The term “benefit-cost analysis” means exactly the same thing as “cost-benefit
analysis” and is preferred by a number of proponents of CBA. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et
al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 221–22 (1996).
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between the many varieties of CBA muddies the debate and can lead to irrational
results that are, ironically, completely at odds with the common sense and
reasonableness we ascribe to Ben Franklin.
Once we approach the debate with an ear tuned to this divergent range of
meanings, a peculiar pattern emerges. Scholars and commentators largely ignore
these distinctions, but to the extent they do take note of CBA’s formal or informal
characteristics, CBA skeptics tend to portray it as highly formalized, rigid, and
technical. Indeed, their objections relate almost exclusively to problems specific to
the formal versions of CBA: the conceptual difficulties that arise from trying to
measure things like human lives and ecosystems in monetary terms, the
controversies surrounding discount rates, the problem of wealth effects, the lack of
scientific data precise enough to allow for meaningful quantification, and so on.
Meanwhile, proponents of CBA are far more likely to paint it in Ben Franklin terms:
as a simple, commonsense, rational weighing of pros and cons. Indeed, from this
vantage point, it can often seem as though the two sides are talking past each other.
Still, this pattern suggests that there is far more potential for broad consensus
to support less formal versions of CBA. We might, then, expect to see agencies—
which tend to be averse to controversy—gravitating toward the informal end of the
spectrum, at least to the extent that the law permits them to do so. But the actual
trend appears to be in precisely the opposite direction. Despite the fact that both the
federal courts and Congress seem to favor less formality in CBA, 4 the executive
branch appears to pull in the direction of increased formality. Executive orders and
guidance documents direct agencies to conduct a fairly formal brand of CBA. 5 And
anecdotal evidence suggests that agencies sometimes go to great lengths to give their
CBAs the trappings of formality in efforts that ultimately prove futile, or even
irrational. Indeed, this is happening even in the face of a recent Supreme Court case,
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 6 in which the Court expressed a clear preference
for informal over formal modes of CBA. 7
Thus, this pull toward formality in the executive branch sparks controversy in
policy and academic circles and is out of step with Congress and the courts.
Moreover, it may be counterproductive, where, for example, it leads to what I call
“false formality.” This is a corruption of CBA that can occur when agencies fail to
clearly define where on the formality-informality spectrum a particular CBA falls,
and is one example of the kind of analytic sloppiness and muddled thinking that
results from a failure to clearly distinguish among different forms of CBA.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes in more detail the
distinctions between formal and informal CBA and presents a typology that helps to
conceptualize and analyze the multiple varieties of CBA. Part III then reviews the
academic debate over CBA and traces the role that conceptions of formality and

4

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
6
556 U.S. 208 (2009).
7
Id. at 226–27.
5
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informality have played in the arguments put forth by proponents and skeptics. Part
IV examines how Congress and the federal courts have made distinctions and
choices between formal and informal versions of CBA in the context of
environmental health and safety laws. Part V then analyzes the executive orders and
guidance documents that govern the use of CBA by federal agencies and describes
the rulemakings leading up to and following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Riverkeeper, in which the pull toward formality led the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) first to irrationality and then to futility. Parts IV and V focus
primarily on the use of CBA in the context of environmental, health, and safety
regulation because this is the area in which CBA has been most extensively used
and in which agency sophistication is probably highest. Many aspects of the
analysis, however, may well be more broadly applicable. Finally, Part VI describes
the lessons this analysis suggests for the broader debate about CBA.
II. THE MULTIPLE FORMS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Broadly speaking, CBA is a decisionmaking technique that weighs and
compares the costs and benefits of a course of action. 8 Within those broad outlines,

8

Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug
Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 996 (1977) (“‘Risk-benefit analysis’ . . .
includes any technique for making choices that explicitly or implicitly attempts to measure
the potential adverse consequences of an activity and to predict its benefits.”); cf. Steven
Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REG. 33, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33 (“At
the broadest and vaguest level, cost-benefit analysis may be regarded simply as systematic
thinking about decision-making.”).
In theory, a CBA could consist of just the tasks of toting up total costs and total benefits
without actually comparing them. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
510 (8th ed. 2011) (“[C]ost-benefit analysis can refer to a method of pure evaluation,
conducted without regard to the possible use of its results in a decision . . . .”). Such an
analysis would provide information only, with no explicit guidance on whether the analyzed
regulation is a good or bad idea. Some authors sometimes appear to define CBA in this way.
See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489,
1498 (2002) (describing CBA “as a tool and a procedure, rather than as a rigid formula to
govern outcomes” that “requires a full accounting of the consequences of an action, in both
quantitative and qualitative terms [that] [o]fficials should have . . . before them when they
make decisions”); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV.
335, 339 (2006) (“CBA of a proposed regulation consists of estimates of the regulation’s
costs and . . . benefits.”). But it strains credibility to imagine that CBA is ever really treated
that way in practice. Once costs and benefits are both toted up, it is hard to imagine the
analyst not, at least implicitly, comparing them. Because I view some comparison of the
costs to the benefits as integral to the enterprise of CBA, I have defined it to explicitly include
that comparison. As discussed below, the manner in which the comparison is performed (i.e.,
the balancing formula used) can vary considerably.
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however, it can refer to a wide and divergent array of procedures and practices. 9 At
one end of the spectrum is the “prudential algebra” Ben Franklin described in his
letter to his friend, Joseph Priestley. 10 This involves identifying benefits and costs
(pros and cons) in purely qualitative terms, listing them in two columns on a sheet
of paper, and then making a judgment about their relative weights. This is all done
without actually attempting to convert them into numeric or monetized terms—that
is, heeding Ben Franklin’s advice that “the weight of reasons cannot be taken with
the precision of algebraic quantities . . . .” 11 At the other end of the spectrum is a
highly technical and theorized branch of welfare economics that attempts to quantify
and monetize all social costs and benefits for a whole range of alternatives using
formal techniques—including discounting future costs and benefits to present net
value—and then attempts to pinpoint the course of action for which marginal
benefits are just equal to marginal costs. 12
Informal, Ben-Franklin-style CBA is intuitive—almost a matter of common
sense. Many of us perform some version of it as a matter of course when making
major life decisions. Understanding the most formal version of CBA, on the other

9

Several others have also distinguished between different forms of CBA. See John C.
Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications
124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (distinguishing between “quantified CBA,”
“guesstimated CBA,” and “conceptual CBA”); Jonathan Cannon, The Sounds of Silence:
Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425,
428–29 (2010) (distinguishing between strong vs. weak forms of CBA); Graham, supra note
2, at 432–38 (distinguishing between soft vs. hard forms of CBA); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECOPRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 39
(1999) (distinguishing between CBA aimed at economic efficiency versus “soft” CBA,
“which would compare costs and benefits without attempting to quantify every factor”).
10
GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph
Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772)).
11
Id.
12
See Merrill, supra note 8, at 996 (describing this kind of formal CBA as CBA “[i]n
its most refined form”). Note that cost-effectiveness analysis—a form of analysis that often
accompanies CBA—does not appear anywhere on this spectrum. Cost-effectiveness analysis
is a distinct form of analysis with a fundamentally different analytic structure. While CBA
measures all the social costs and social benefits of a given course of action and compares
them, cost-effectiveness analysis takes a single regulatory goal or endpoint (e.g., saving one
human life) and compares the costs of reaching that goal under various regulatory
alternatives. See E. J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 8 (5th ed. 2007);
NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES xi
(2014) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vw
AN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GA38-AUXP. Thus,
cost-effectiveness analysis does not purport to measure the total net social benefits of a
course of action as CBA does, and, rather than comparing overall social costs directly to
overall social benefits, cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of various alternative
methods for achieving a single regulatory benefit.
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hand, requires some grounding in the basics of welfare economics, which the
following section provides.
A. Welfare Economics and CBA
Welfare economics is the normative branch of economics. It traces its roots to
utilitarianism and is built around the normative principle of “efficiency”—that is,
the maximization of the overall welfare of members of society in the aggregate. 13
Measuring aggregate “welfare” has always been problematic, however. The early
welfare economists rejected the notion that welfare or levels of happiness could be
compared across individuals. 14 Nineteenth century social scientist, Vilfredo Pareto,
found a way around this problem by constructing a definition of efficiency that
avoids trading off one person’s welfare gain or loss against another’s. 15 Under what
is now known as the Pareto Principle, one state of affairs is a “Pareto improvement”
over another if it would result in at least one person being better off and no one being
worse off. 16 A situation is “Pareto optimum” or “Pareto efficient,” therefore, if there
is no alternative state of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement. 17
Under the laws of welfare economics, Pareto efficiency will be achieved by a
perfectly functioning market 18—one in which participants act rationally (consumers
maximize “utility,” or preference satisfaction, and producers maximize profits),
there are no transaction costs, information is perfect, and all social costs and benefits
are accounted for in private costs and benefits (i.e., there are no externalities). 19 To
get an intuitive sense of why this is so, consider that in a perfect market, every
transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer produces a Pareto

13
See Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351–52
(1999). But see Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 129–30 (1979) (explaining distinctions between welfare economics and
utilitarianism).
14
See Sen, supra note 13, at 352 (“Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and
no common denominator of feelings is possible.” (citation omitted)); Oscar Lange, The
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 10 ECONOMETRICA 215, 215 (1942) (stating that
interpersonal comparisons have a “lack of operational significance”). But see Sen, supra note
13, at 356–60 (arguing that interpersonal welfare comparisons are possible).
15
See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 31.
16
Id.
17
See Gerard Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 588, 588 (1954); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21
STETSON L. REV. 121, 127 (1991). But see Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43
ECONOMICA 217, 235 (1976) (arguing that Pareto principle is inconsistent with basic liberal
rights); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 19–21 (2006) (describing objections to the Pareto standard).
18
See ROGER PERMAN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
90–93 (1996).
19
See id.; ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 53 (4th ed. 2011).
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improvement. Since the transaction is voluntary, both buyer and seller enjoy an
increase in welfare. 20 Moreover, since in a perfect market there are no externalities,
all of the costs and benefits associated with the transaction accrue to the two parties,
and no one else is made worse off. Thus, under perfect conditions, the market will
reach an equilibrium point of Pareto efficiency—that is, a point at which there is no
alternative state of affairs that would be a Pareto improvement. 21
Where the market is imperfect, however—where, for example, manufacturing
some market good produces an externality like pollution that makes people sick or
harms ecosystems—it will fail to achieve Pareto efficiency. In such circumstances
it is appropriate, according to economic theory, for government to intervene with
regulation to try to correct the market failure. But, economists argue, when
government does step in, it should calibrate its regulation to mimic the economically
efficient outcome that a perfectly functioning market would have produced.
This is where CBA comes in. Economists use CBA to try to identify the
perfectly efficient level of regulation. The problem is that any attempt to use Pareto
efficiency as the standard for judging the efficiency of government intervention is
impractical. 22 First, it is probably impossible to find a government action that does
not cause harm to at least one person. Thus, virtually all government intervention
would fail a Pareto-efficiency test. Second, the informational burden of trying to
break down aggregate costs and benefits into individual costs and benefits is
insurmountable. Accordingly, for these purposes, many economists turn to a slightly
different definition of efficiency with “somewhat less conceptual appeal, but much
greater feasibility” known as “potential Pareto” or “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency. 23
Under this definition, a government regulation is more efficient than the status quo
if those who stand to benefit from the regulation could fully compensate those who
stand to lose from it and still be better off. Or, put another way, a regulation is more
efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if, following a hypothetical transfer of wealth
from the winners to the losers, the resulting state of affairs would be a Pareto
improvement. 24 Notice that a regulation meets this test whether or not the
hypothetical wealth transfer occurs (and it virtually never does). 25
Thus, many economists use the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rather than
Pareto efficiency as the basis for evaluating regulations and other public projects

20

See POSNER, supra note 8, at 20.
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 23 (2d ed. 1996); see also PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 158 (17th ed. 2001) (explaining that perfectly competitive markets
create a state of “allocative efficiency,” meaning that “no possible reorganization of
production can make anyone better off without making someone else worse off”).
22
See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 31–32.
23
BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 32; POSNER, supra note 8, at 17–20.
24
BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 32; MISHAN, supra note 2, at 390–91.
25
See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 32.
21
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and policies under CBA. 26 In this way, they defend CBA as a normative standard
for judging government intervention, while recognizing that it performs an imperfect
imitation of the Pareto efficiency produced by a perfect market and no longer avoids
the philosophical conundrums associated with interpersonal welfare comparisons
that Pareto efficiency so effectively sidesteps. 27
Accordingly, any regulation for which total social benefits exceed total social
costs (in comparison to the status quo) constitutes a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.
And an economist could, in theory at least, identify the level of regulation that is
optimally efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense by measuring all of the social costs
and benefits of a whole range of regulatory alternatives and then locating the
alternative that provides the highest level of net social benefit. 28 On the graph in
Figure 1, for example, the third alternative (“even more stringent regulation”) would
be the “efficient” one in the language of economic theory because it provides the
highest net social benefit, even though the fourth alternative (“most stringent”)
provides higher benefits in absolute terms.

26

Id. This might be considered the mainstream view, at least in this country, but the
discipline of economics is hardly a monolith and there are plenty of economists who reject
this approach. See, e.g., David Ellerman, On a Fallacy in the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency-Equity
Analysis, 25 CONST. POL. ECON. 125, 127–28 (2014); see also ADLER & POSNER, supra note
27, at 21–24 (rejecting Kaldor-Hicks defense of CBA). In the United Kingdom and Europe,
the dominant approach to CBA grounds it in the idea of a social welfare function rather than
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Matthew D. Adler et al., The Social Value of Mortality Risk
Reduction: VSL Versus the Social Welfare Function Approach, 35 J. HEALTH ECON. 82, 82
(2014) (comparing the differing approaches of the United States and United Kingdom to
cost-benefit analysis). For an explanation of social welfare functions, see PERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 27–37, 85–86.
27
See MISHAN, supra note 2, at 382–96; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 190 (1999) (noting that “[m]ost
economists appear to concede that the Kaldor-Hicks standard is not, by itself, normatively
desirable” but defend it nonetheless on the grounds that benefits to winners and costs to
losers will wash out in the end).
28
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 137
(1978); see BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 13, 33; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 9–10 (2003).
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FIGURE 1. Total costs and benefits of varying levels of regulation.

Ideally, the economist would have enough data on the costs and benefits of
incrementally more and less stringent regulatory alternatives to plot on a graph the
marginal benefits and marginal costs of regulation at each possible level of
stringency. (The change in the level of costs or benefits produced by each
incremental change in the stringency of the regulation is called a “marginal cost” or
a “marginal benefit.”) In many instances, the relationship between costs and benefits
is something like that shown in Figure 2. That is, marginal benefits exceed costs at
low levels of stringency, but as the stringency of regulation increases the marginal
costs gradually increase while the marginal benefits gradually decrease until the two
lines cross, and at higher levels of stringency, marginal costs exceed marginal
benefits. In such a case, the level of regulation at which net benefits are
maximized—the point of optimal Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 29—is the level at which
the two curves cross, that is, where marginal costs are just equal to marginal
benefits. 30 Figure 2 illustrates this idea. Thus, assuming (1) sufficient data, (2)

29

Notice that I use the term “efficiency” interchangeably with “optimal efficiency” to
refer to a state of net benefits maximization. Some authors use the term “efficiency” in the
context of welfare economics more loosely, to refer to any state of affairs that increases net
benefits over the status quo, even if it does not achieve net benefits maximization.
30
See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 33–36; TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 25, 66 (5th ed. 2000); Richard D. Morgenstern,
Conducting an Economic Analysis: Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 25, 40 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed.,
1997); Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 221.
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relevant values that can all be meaningfully monetized, and (3) technologies that
allow for incrementally varying levels of control (three big assumptions), an
economist would be able to identify the point of economic efficiency.

FIGURE 2. Marginal costs and benefits of incrementally varying levels of regulation.

Welfare economics, then, presumes a kind of cost-benefit analysis that
measures the social costs and benefits of many alternative regulations at
incrementally varying levels of stringency. Moreover, because the purpose is to
identify the precise point at which marginal costs just equal marginal benefits, this
form of CBA must quantify all of the social costs and all of the social benefits for
each regulatory alternative and convert all of those quantities into a common metric
(usually dollars) so that, for each alternative, all costs and benefits can be aggregated
and compared. 31
B. Complications and Critiques
This quantification and monetization raises a host of complications. In many
instances, we simply lack good information and data on how much a regulation will

31

See MISHAN, supra note 2, at 180–81.
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cost or on the benefits it might provide to human or ecological health. 32 But more
fundamentally, using dollars to measure nonmarket goods—like saving people from
dying of cancer or an endangered species from extinction—raises a host of
intractable theoretical problems. Some take the position that converting such values
to a monetary (or any other common) metric confronts incommensurability
problems that are simply insurmountable. 33 And there are other, more subtle
problems as well.
First, in order to aggregate and compare costs and benefits that will not accrue
until a future date alongside those accrued in the present, cost-benefit analysis
typically applies a discount rate to future costs and benefits. While such discounting
makes sense when comparing purely monetary sums, when applied to natural
resources, human lives, and future generations, it confronts deep theoretical
difficulties. 34 Even those who view discounting of such values as appropriate are far
from consensus on the proper method for setting the rate. 35 As a result, the discount
rates applied in practice vary widely and yield wildly differing outcomes when
applied to time periods of a decade or more. 36
Additionally, dollars do not provide a consistent measure of value across rich
and poor people because of the declining marginal value of money (the fact that a
dollar is worth more to a poor person than to a rich person) and the fact that
willingness to pay is constrained by ability to pay. 37 A phenomenon known as “the

32

See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 134 (1991); Ronnie Levin, Lead
in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 30, at 205, 230; Amy
Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits at 21–27 (March 16, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Utah Law Review).
33
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55–59 (1993); MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1–7
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
841–42 (1994); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein,
102 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1465–66 (2014) (critiquing the Department of Justice’s attempts to
quantify the costs of prison rape) (“To ask how much victims of sexual assault would be
willing to accept assault is . . . to misunderstand the very nature of the crime . . . .”).
34
Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting
of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 955–86 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our
Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999).
35
Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 57
(2012) (“In the literature, one finds a large range of acceptable values for discount rates . . .
large enough to permit the strategic manipulation of outcomes . . . .”).
36
Id. at 57–62.
37
Some argue that CBA can be designed to incorporate distributional weightings in
order to correct for the problem of wealth effects. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview (Duke Envtl. & Energy Econ. Working
Paper
Series, Working
Paper No.
EE 13-04, 2013), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3110, archived at http://perma.cc/5M
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endowment effect” presents a related problem. Experiments show that people
demand significantly more to give up a good that they already have than they are
willing to pay to obtain the same good if they do not have it yet. 38 Any attempt to
measure values in dollar terms is accordingly indeterminate.
Despite these problems, economists have developed a number of clever
techniques for trying to divine the monetary value of things not traded in markets. 39
Hedonic surveys are an example of a “revealed preference” technique. These
surveys attempt to infer a dollar value for nonmarket goods by observing things that
are traded in markets and are thought to reflect (or “reveal”) the unpriced value. 40
Thus, an economist might attempt to measure the value people attach to unspoiled
open space by comparing the prices of otherwise comparable properties located
adjacent to spoiled and unspoiled areas. 41 Or an economist might measure the
recreational “use value” attached to natural resources by measuring the admission
fees and travel costs hikers pay to visit a national park. 42

99-EHFV; Gregory Scott Crespi, Correcting for the Wealth Bias of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Through Use of “Percentage of Wealth”-based Valuations, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 149,
149–56 (2013). But this is an underdeveloped and controversial technique. See Susan RoseAckerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 335, 339 (2011).
38
See John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426, 426–47 (2002); Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy
Implications of Disparities Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded
Measures of Values, 18. J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 227, 227–37 (1990); but see generally
Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the
“Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting
Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (arguing that previous experiments
demonstrating a gap between willingness to pay and willingness to accept were skewed by
subject misconceptions, and reporting results of experiment controlling for all previously
identified sources of subject misconception that found no such gap).
39
See generally DAVID W. PEARCE & ANIL MARKANDYA, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
BENEFITS: MONETARY VALUATION (1989) (discussing various direct and indirect benefit
valuation techniques, including hedonic and contingent valuation methods).
40
See generally David S. Brookshire et al., Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of
Survey and Hedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165 (1982); see also BOARDMAN ET
AL., supra note 19, at 353–57; Philip E. Graves, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental
Projects: A Plethora of Biases Understating Net Benefits, 3 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1,
12–19 (2012).
41
E.g., Richard Ready & Charles Abdalla, The Impact of Open Space and Potential
Local Disamenities on Residential Property Values in Berks County, Pennsylvania (Pa. State
Univ. Dep’t Agric. Econ. & Rural Sociology, Staff Paper No. 363, 2003), available at
http://aese.psu.edu/directory/aic/the-impact-of-open-space-and-potential-local-disamenities
-on-residential-property-values-in-berks-county-pennsylvania, archived at http://perma.cc/
2W4Z-JZ6V.
42
See Shi-Ling Hsu & John Loomis, A Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Natural
Resource Policy, [2002] 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,239, 10,242 (Feb. 2002);
BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 358–65.
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Alternatively, where values can’t be “revealed” through actual market
transactions, economists turn to “stated preference” methods. “Contingent
valuation” surveys—also called “stated-preference surveys”—attempt to determine
people’s willingness to pay for nonmarket goods by simply asking them. 43 In what
is essentially a sophisticated public-opinion poll, respondents are given information
about a particular natural resource or medical condition and then asked how much
they would be willing to pay to preserve the resource or avoid the disease. One such
stated-preference survey, for example, concludes that the average California
household is willing to pay $18.14 per year to increase gray whale populations by
100 percent. 44 Another concludes that the average person is willing to pay $457,000
to avoid contracting chronic bronchitis. 45
All of these methods are controversial and produce highly contestable results. 46
One problem, for example, is the endowment effect, discussed above. Even though
measuring willingness to pay (to buy) versus willingness to accept (to sell) yields
different values for the same good, economists have yet to come up with any
principled basis for choosing between these two measures of value. This makes
stated-preference surveys, which are almost always designed to measure willingness
to pay, vulnerable to criticism that they underestimate the values they try to measure.
In sum, the kind of CBA that emerges out of the theory of welfare economics
is highly formal, complex, and technical—a far cry from Ben Franklin’s prudential
algebra. Using these two extremes as a starting point, the next section develops a
typology of formality and informality in CBA.
C. Formality and Informality in CBA: A Typology
The two forms of CBA described in the previous section, which I will refer to
as “Ben Franklin CBA” and “Economic CBA,” define two ends of a spectrum from
informality to formality. Many forms of CBA fall somewhere in between. By
defining the two extremes, however, we can see that these different forms of CBA
have characteristics that vary along three distinct but related axes.

43
See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 372–405; Hsu & Loomis, supra note 42, at
10,242; Thomas H. Stevens et al., Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM
Estimates Really Show?, 67 LAND ECON. 390, 392–97 (1991). For a critique, see generally
John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995).
44
John B. Loomis & Douglas M. Larson, Total Economic Values of Increasing Gray
Whale Populations: Results from a Contingent Valuation Survey of Visitors and Households,
9 MARINE RES. ECON. 275, 282 tbl.1 (1994).
45
See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Pricing Environmental Health Risks: Survey Assessments
of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 32, 47, 50 (1991).
46
See DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 141–58 (1990); Leonard Shabman & Kurt Stephenson,
Environmental Valuation and Its Economic Critics, 126 J. WATER RES. PLAN. & MGMT. 382,
382–84 (2000).
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Axis 1 describes the level of quantification and monetization involved in the
assessment of costs and benefits. Axis 2 describes the degree of precision with which
the comparison is made. 47 And Axis 3 describes the number of regulatory
alternatives for which cost/benefit estimates are generated. As discussed below,
these three axes are related in that where a particular CBA falls along one axis may
affect where it can logically fall along the other two.
1. The Three Axes
Axis 1, as illustrated in Figure 3, extends from the purely qualitative description
of pros and cons involved in a Ben Franklin CBA on the left, to the full quantification
and monetization of all aspects of social costs and benefits that is required for an
Economic CBA on the right. There are obviously an infinite variety of possibilities
between these two extremes, only a few of which are described in the boxes on the
diagram. Costs and/or benefits may be partially quantified to varying degrees. And
even where there is quantification, there may not be monetization, leaving costs and
benefits expressed in different metrics.

FIGURE 3. Axis 1.

It is also worth pointing out that an analysis that falls all the way to the right on
Axis 1—that is, that fully monetizes absolutely all costs and benefits—is
undoubtedly impossible to achieve in practice. 48 Even the next box to the left (“All
significant costs & benefits quantified and monetized”) is probably impossible to
achieve in practice much of the time, at least with respect to environmental
regulation, although this is a more controversial statement. 49 Indeed, much

47

Professor David Driesen has previously identified some of the points along this axis,
calling them the “efficiency criterion,” the “no excess cost criterion,” and the
“proportionality criterion” (“costs should not grossly exceed benefits”). David M. Driesen,
Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318–19 (2011); Driesen, supra note 8, at 387–94.
48
See, e.g., MICHAEL FAURE & GÖRAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 166 (2003) (“All costs and benefits
are, in reality, of course, not measurable.”); BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 10–12
(discussing various impediments to full quantification and monetization).
49
See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 11 (noting that quantifying and monetizing
environmental values is “especially contentious”).
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disagreement between the supporters and skeptics of CBA probably boils down to
differing beliefs about the feasibility of getting somewhere close to the right end of
Axis 1 in practice.
Axis 2, illustrated in Figure 4, describes the precision of the balancing test used
to compare costs and benefits. This axis extends from the rough, apples-to-oranges
comparison that occurs under Ben Franklin CBA on the left, to, on the other end,
pinpointing the level of regulatory stringency at which marginal benefits and
marginal costs are just equal in order to identify the point of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
under Economic CBA. Here there are also a variety of possibilities in between the
two extremes, the most prominent of which are identified in the boxes in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4. Axis 2.

The balancing tests along Axis 2 actually vary along two separate dimensions.
First, they vary with respect to the precision with which costs and benefits must be
compared. Locating the point at which marginal costs and benefits are equal requires
more precision than a rough comparison. Second, some of the tests vary with respect
to the proportion of benefits to costs that triggers the tipping point—in other words,
where the fulcrum is placed on the scales. Thus, the third box from the right (“precise
comparison to ensure benefits exceed costs”) probably requires at least a 1.1 to 1
ratio of benefits to costs, while the “costs not wholly disproportionate to benefits”
test might put the tipping point at 1 to 5 or even 1 to 25. 50 On the other end of the
spectrum, Economic CBA requires total benefits to exceed total costs as much as
possible (maximization of net benefits).
In principle, the placement of the fulcrum doesn’t necessarily have any
connection to formality or informality. It could simply reflect a judgment by, say,
Congress about where it wants the risk of error to fall. (A wholly disproportionate
test allows more regulation through than a benefits-exceed-costs test.) Notice in this
regard that the tests are not arrayed in order on Axis 2 with respect to fulcrum
placement: the left-most box (“rough comparison”) probably puts the fulcrum in

50

Note that under Economic CBA, comparing costs and benefits through the ratio of
the two is inappropriate because it is the absolute amount of net benefits to society that is
important. See GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 42; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A4, at 10 (2003).
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about the same place as the third box from the right (“precise comparison to ensure
benefits exceed costs”). 51
In practice, however, the position of the fulcrum ends up also having
implications for the level of precision used in the balance. Thus, the balancing test
for Economic CBA in the rightmost position on Axis 2 requires a fulcrum shift—
benefits must exceed costs as much as possible. But that fulcrum shift also implies
a precise balance, because finding the point of net benefits maximization requires
locating the point where marginal costs and benefits are just equal. The wholly
disproportionate test probably operates similarly. One could in principle interpret
this test to impose a precise tipping point; for example, benefits that are 10% of costs
are okay, but benefits at 9% of costs are not. In practice, however, it seems likely
that the real significance of the fulcrum shifting accomplished by the wholly
disproportionate standard is that it allows for a rougher comparison. One can tell
from a distance whether two elements are wholly disproportionate, even if the
picture is fuzzy. Discerning whether one element just exceeds another, however,
may require a sharper, more precise image. 52 Accordingly, with the caveats stated
above, I have chosen to arrange these balancing tests on a single axis, placing the
emphasis on the precision of the balance (an aspect of formality) rather than the
placement of the fulcrum.
Axis 3, illustrated in Figure 5, describes the number of alternatives for which
costs and benefits are evaluated and compared. This can obviously range from a
single alternative to the full spectrum of incrementally varying alternatives that
would be necessary in order to graph the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves
for an Economic CBA. Here, too, there are of course many possible points in
between—as many as there are incrementally varying alternatives.

FIGURE 5. Axis 3.

51

A break-even analysis, which is essentially a way of trying to get a handle on whether
benefits exceed costs when benefits are only partially monetized, also puts the fulcrum in the
same place. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
52
The EPA, at least, appears to treat the standard this way. See infra notes 299–300 and
accompanying text (describing the EPA’s stated justification for using a wholly
disproportionate test in the cooling water intake rule under the Clean Water Act: “important
benefit effect categories will very likely not be able to be quantified and monetized”).
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Axis 3 is overidealized and potentially misleading to the extent it suggests that
alternatives can always be neatly ranked in linear fashion along an ordinal scale. 53
Sometimes—where, for example, the relevant technologies allow for incrementally
varying levels of pollution control—such a linear ranking will be possible. But in
other instances (e.g., where the question is whether to build a shopping mall or a
housing development on endangered species habitat) a linear ranking may not be
possible. 54 Nonetheless, with these caveats, this admittedly over-simplified
depiction is useful for purposes of this typology.
2. The Relationship Between Axes 1 and 2
Once we have mapped out these three axes, we can begin to see the
relationships between them. The relationships between Axes 1 and 2 are depicted in
Figure 6 below. Moving toward a more precise and formal balancing test along Axis
2, for example, probably requires a parallel move toward formality (and increased
quantification and monetization) along Axis 1. A CBA cannot, for example, pinpoint
the level at which marginal costs just equal marginal benefits (the right-most
position on Axis 2) without fully quantifying and monetizing all costs and benefits
(the right-most position on Axis 1). Even moving to the third box from the right on
Axis 2 (“precise comparison to ensure benefits exceed costs”) will likely pose
difficulties for a CBA not occupying one of the two right-most boxes on Axis 1.

53

It is also impossible in practice, of course, to take all conceivable alternatives into
account. And the decision about which alternatives to include can make formal CBA highly
vulnerable to manipulation. See Catherine A. O’Neill, The Mathematics of Mercury, in
REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 108, 113 (Winston Harrington et al. eds.,
2009).
54
In such an instance, the analyst could still, theoretically, identify the alternative that
maximized net benefits, though constructing meaningful marginal cost/benefit curves likely
would be difficult or impossible. Such an inquiry is largely, if not wholly, academic,
however, since any such example must almost by definition present significant
quantification/monetization problems under Axis 1 as well. Cf. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609
(2000).
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FIGURE 6. The relationship between Axes 1 and 2.

Imagine, for example, a CBA, which—as is often the case—provides a
relatively complete monetization of costs but only a partial monetization of benefits.
If the (partial) benefits are greater than the (full) costs, one can comfortably 55
conclude that the true benefits also exceed the true costs, even under the “precise
comparison” test. 56 If, on the other hand, the (full) costs are greater than the (partial)
benefits, it is arguably much harder to reach a conclusion. Unless there is some good
reason to believe that the unmonetized benefits are trivial, some would argue that
one cannot reach any conclusion at all about whether the true costs exceed the true
benefits. 57 Others might say that a determination about whether benefits “justify” or
“outweigh” costs can still be made in such circumstances by considering qualitative
and quantitative descriptions of the nonmonetized benefits. 58 But all would probably
agree that a precise comparison is impossible. Thus, if a complete-costs-partial-

55

This, of course, assumes that one is comfortable with the monetized values assigned
to begin with.
56
There are certainly real-world examples of exactly this scenario, especially involving
Clean Air Act rules affecting particulate matter emissions, a pollutant for which data showing
adverse human health effects is plentiful. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing the
EPA’s CBA for its 1999 revised particulate matter NAAQS, showing benefits of $58 to $110
billion and costs of $6 billion).
57
See Driesen, supra note 8, at 401; Levin, supra note 32, at 230. But see Arden Rowell,
Partial Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 741 (2012) (arguing that
where benefits are unquantifiable due to incommensurability, they should simply be
excluded and CBA conducted using only monetizable costs and benefits: “[T]here is no room
to allow non-monetizable benefits to affect the outcome of a monetary cost-benefit
analysis.”).
58
See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. These are the tests contained in the
Clinton and Reagan executive orders (respectively) that require(d) agencies to conduct CBA
of major federal regulations. See infra notes 219–220 and accompanying text.
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benefits CBA is subjected to a precise comparison, it produces an asymmetry: if the
monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs, the result is definitive, but if benefits
fall short of costs, the result is inconclusive. 59 This point is illustrated in Figure 7,
below, by the dotted line labeled “potential failure.”

FIGURE 7. Asymmetry resulting when monetized benefits fail to exceed monetized costs.

In such instances, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 60
encourages agencies to conduct what they call a “break-even” or “threshold”
analysis. 61 This kind of analysis subtracts the partial benefits estimate from the (full)
costs estimate and then asks the analyst to make an intuitive judgment whether the
remaining unquantifiable benefits are likely large enough to make up the
difference. 62 This is essentially a less precise apples-to-oranges balancing standard,
which I have located further to the left on Axis 2. 63

59

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 10 (2003) (“When important
benefits and costs cannot be expressed in monetary units, BCA is less useful, and it can even
be misleading, because the calculation of net benefits in such cases does not provide a full
evaluation of all relevant benefits and costs.”).
60
OIRA is a White House office within the Office of Management and Budget that is
specifically tasked with administering the requirement in Executive Order 12,866 that
agencies conduct CBA of major rules. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012).
61
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 2 (2003).
62
Id.
63
Cass Sunstein might dispute this characterization. In a recent article, he argues that,
at least in some circumstances, break-even analysis can be conducted in a more systematic
and analytically rigorous way. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits,
102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (critiquing Professor Sunstein’s position); Daniel A.
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Alternatively, for a CBA that does some amount of quantification or
monetization of costs and benefits but does not fully monetize (either the second or
third box from the left on Axis 1), it might be possible to occupy the third box from
the left on Axis 2—that is, to say whether costs are “wholly disproportionate to
benefits.” 64 A version of CBA commonly used by the EPA under the Clean Water
Act takes this form. Expressing costs in dollars and benefits in pounds of pollutant
removed from a factory’s effluent, it asks whether, for example, $100 in costs is
“wholly disproportionate” to the benefit of removing fifty pounds of phosphorous
pollution. 65
Where only partial monetization is achieved on Axis 1, any of the less precise
balancing formulas on the left of Axis 2 (rough balancing, break-even, or wholly
disproportionate) essentially engage the analyst in an intuitive, apples-to-oranges
comparison. Even though the EPA and OIRA take the position that this kind of
balancing can be meaningfully accomplished and courts arguably engage in a similar
analytic exercise every time they apply the myriad balancing tests that are
commonplace in the common law, it is not necessarily an uncontroversial concept.
Some would undoubtedly argue that this kind of apples-to-oranges comparison is
irrational. How can we know how fifty pounds of phosphorous pollution compares
to $100? But others would argue that such comparisons can be meaningfully made. 66
Certainly, we would at least want to know a little more about the kind of harm fifty
pounds of phosphorous might cause, but in many instances the agency probably does
know more. Let’s say we know that fifty pounds of phosphorous per year will cause
significant eutrophication of the waterway, thus starving fish and other aquatic
organisms of oxygen and causing substantial disruption to the existing aquatic
ecosystem. With enough specificity in the qualitative description of benefits, a

Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven Analysis, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (same); Heinzerling, supra note 33 (same).
64
Particularly if we view the “wholly disproportionate” test as aimed at eliminating
only the most extreme cases—where a rule seems to eliminate only a de minimis amount of
pollution but at great cost—then the idea that an apples-to-oranges comparison can be
meaningfully made under such a test seems plausible.
65
See infra notes 142 to 143 and accompanying text.
66
See, e.g., Frank Ackerman, What Should OIRA Do? Comments on the Role of CostBenefit Analysis in Regulatory Review, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS (Feb. 24,
2009), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/D, archived at http://perma.cc
/9H6H-AEZ6 (“Costs, typically expressed in dollars, can be directly compared to benefits
expressed in natural, typically non-monetary units such as lives saved, illnesses avoided, and
environmental resources protected. The comparison is inevitably deliberative—and it is far
more transparent and comprehensible than a fully monetized cost-benefit calculation.”);
ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 215 (arguing for qualitative balancing); Rachel Bayefsky,
Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732, 1735–37 (2014)
(arguing for an informal variety of CBA that describes certain values that resist monetization,
like dignity, in purely quantitative terms, but with specificity).
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meaningful apples-to-oranges comparison may well be possible. 67 But it is
undoubtedly a point on which there is room for debate.
This example assumes that both costs and benefits are fully described—if not
in quantitative terms, then in qualitative ones. But what if some (or all) of the
benefits are simply unknown? What if we know that removing a certain amount of
dioxin from factory effluents will provide human health benefits in the form of a
certain number of avoided cancers, but we also suspect that dioxin is an endocrine
disruptor causing additional health impacts that researchers don’t understand well
enough to come up with even a ballpark estimate of magnitude? And what if
researchers simply have not studied the impacts of dioxin on species and ecosystems
and consequently understand those impacts only dimly, if at all? If some of the
benefits are unquantifiable because they are unknown, the challenges to conducting
a meaningful balance are of an entirely different order. Under these conditions, even
a rough comparison, “wholly disproportionate” test, or break-even analysis may
become impossible to apply in a meaningful way, although the extent of the problem
will depend on the specific numbers. 68

67

See Bayefsky, supra note 66, at 1750, 1771–81.
Imagine, for example, a CBA in which the costs are fully monetized at $200 million,
the benefits are only partially monetized at $250 million, and there are additional unknown
benefits that cannot be described in either quantitative or qualitative terms. Since even the
partially monetized benefits are bigger than the costs, the analyst could find that this
regulation passes muster under either an “exceeds” test or a “wholly disproportionate” test.
If we change the scenario only slightly, so that fully monetized costs are still $200 million,
but the partial benefits are only $150 million, then the analyst would probably be able to
conclude that the wholly disproportionate test is met (i.e., that costs are not wholly
disproportionate to benefits), but would not be able to reach a conclusion under the “exceeds”
test. If the fully monetized costs are $200 million, but the partially monetized benefits are
only $500,000, however, it might well be impossible to reach a conclusion under either test.
These scenarios, involving costs that are fully (or nearly fully) monetized and benefits
that are only partially monetized, are fairly common (one might even say ubiquitous) in
environmental law, where benefits relating to human health and species and ecosystems are
notoriously difficult to quantify and monetize. Clean Air Act regulations frequently fall into
the first category—with partially monetized benefits significantly outweighing fully
monetized costs—because a number of health impacts associated with particulate matter
pollution are relatively well understood and have generated substantial, reliable data. See,
e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, The Clean Air Interstate Rule, in REFORMING REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 20, 25–28. Regulation of most other kinds of
environmental harm and pollution, on the other hand, often falls into the second or third
categories—with partially monetized benefits lower than costs. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RISK &
REASON, supra note 2, at 166 (the EPA’s CBA of its 2001 regulation of arsenic in drinking
water pegged costs at $210 million and benefits at $140 million to $198 million). Regulation
of ecological harms in particular is likely to fall in the third category. The EPA’s efforts to
conduct CBA of its regulation of cooling water intake structures at power plants and other
industrial facilities, for example, which I discuss in Part V.B, is an example of the third
category, in which partially monetized benefits fall far short of fully monetized costs, making
a meaningful conclusion under any test impossible. See generally Sinden, supra note 32
68
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In fact, significant levels of unknown—as opposed to unquantifiable or
unmonetizable—benefits arguably take the analysis off the diagram altogether. Even
the most informal version of CBA depicted in the diagram—the Ben Franklin
style—assumes that all costs and benefits are known, at least enough to be
qualitatively described. Franklin envisioned that all of the “pros and cons” could be
put down in one column or the other on a sheet of paper, such that “the whole lies
before me.” 69 If there are big blank spaces in one or both columns—representing
unknown costs or benefits of unknown magnitude—then even the kind of rough,
intuitive comparison that Franklin envisioned becomes very problematic and
probably impossible.
Attempting to depict this on the diagram requires extending Axes 1 and 2 even
further to the left, beyond Ben Franklin CBA:

FIGURE 8. Unknown benefits.

Thus, where benefits (or costs) become not just unquantifiable, but unknown
(incapable of even qualitative description), CBA may fail altogether, which is to say,
meaningful comparison of costs and benefits becomes impossible. 70
To generalize, then, a move toward informality on Axis 1 (less quantification
and monetization) will generally require a parallel move toward informality on Axis
2 (less precision in balancing). The converse is usually true, though not always. A
move toward informality on Axis 2 is likely to be accompanied by a parallel move
on Axis 1, though need not be in every case. Moving all the way to the left on Axis
2 requires some move toward informality on Axis 1 because the left-most positions

(analyzing how often and to what extent the problem of unquantified benefits arise in agency
CBAs).
69
GRAMLICH, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph
Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772)).
70
See Arrow, et al., supra note 3, at 221 (“In some cases . . . benefit-cost analysis cannot
be used to conclude that the economic benefits of a decision will exceed or fall short of its
costs, because there is simply too much uncertainty.”).
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on Axis 2 are simply incompatible with the right-most positions on Axis 1. (How
can one conduct a rough comparison or break-even analysis of fully monetized
values?) A move from the right-most end of Axis 2 to the “wholly disproportionate”
test, on the other hand, would probably allow for a parallel move toward less
quantification on Axis 1, but would not require it.
3. The Relationship Between Axes 2 and 3
The second and third axes are also closely related. Figure 9 adds these
relationships to the diagram.

FIGURE 9. The relationship between Axes 2 and 3.

Certainly, if a CBA falls all the way to the left on Axis 3 (costs and benefits are
measured only for a single alternative), then it is impossible to move all the way to
the right on Axis 2, that is, to pinpoint the level of regulation at which marginal costs
are just equal to marginal benefits. Indeed, a CBA in the right-most position on Axis
2 must also occupy the right-most positions on Axes 1 and 3. It is impossible to
pinpoint the regulation for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs without
fully quantifying and expressing in a single metric both costs and benefits (Axis 1)
and without measuring costs and benefits for a large number of alternatives (Axis
3).
Alternatively, a CBA can take a diagonal trajectory starting at the formal end
of Axis 1, fully quantifying and monetizing all costs and benefits, and ending on the
informal end of Axis 3 because it only estimates the costs and benefits of a single
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alternative. Such a CBA would also fall near the middle of Axis 2 (in the third box
from the right) because it would be able to precisely compare the single alternative’s
total costs to its total benefits. 71
4. The Different Roles of Formal and Informal CBA
Figure 9 also helps to make salient another important insight about the
distinction between formal and informal CBA. Economic CBA—by measuring the
costs and benefits of numerous incrementally different alternatives (Axis 3)—
chooses one perfect option from a whole range of alternatives. Theoretically at least,
it has the capacity to tell the agency at precisely which level of stringency it should
set the regulation—that is, to choose the optimally “efficient” level of regulation
from a whole range of all possible alternatives. On the other hand, any analysis
located all the way to the left on Axis 3—measuring the costs and benefits of only a
single alternative—merely provides a binary go-or-no-go answer for a single option.
Thus, formal and informal CBA perform fundamentally different functions in
the decisionmaking process. At the formal end of the spectrum, an Economic CBA
acts as a standard setting tool, telling the agency exactly where to set the regulatory
standard among a whole range of options. 72 A more informal CBA, on the other
hand (at the middle or left end of the spectrum), acts as a sort of secondary check or
litmus test on a standard setting decision that has been made by other means. 73 Once
the agency has decided on the basis of some other decisionmaking criterion where
to set the standard, it can then subject that single option to an informal CBA in order
to decide whether or not to proceed. 74
This analysis reveals another important insight. While an informal or middleof-the-spectrum CBA gives policymakers a vague idea about whether a regulation
is desirable in comparison to the status quo or moves in the direction of efficiency,
it has no capacity to tell them—even with perfect information—whether a regulation

71

See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 657, 657 (2010) (defining CBA as a test that is satisfied if the regulation at issue
“produces benefits (in terms of deaths, injuries, and other losses avoided) greater than the
cost of compliance”).
72
See Nathaniel O. Keohane, The Technocratic and Democratic Functions of the CAIR
Regulatory Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 33,
47 (noting that a CBA evaluating only one option “fails to meet the most basic requirement
of sound economic policy analysis: namely, the consideration of multiple alternatives”).
73
See Cannon, supra note 9, at 454 (describing informal CBA, what he calls “the weak
form of CBA,” as a tool for “screen[ing] for irrational outcomes”); Cole, supra note 35, at
57 (“[CBA] is viewed as a kind of filter designed to capture welfare-reducing proposals,
while allowing welfare-enhancing proposals to pass through.”).
74
Keohane, supra note 72, at 47 (“A document that considers the costs and benefits of
the proposed policy only relative to the status quo cannot possibly have been used to design
that policy.”). See also Driesen, supra note 47, at 320 (criticizing Professors Jonathan S.
Masur and Eric A. Posner for confusing these two different functions of CBA).
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is “efficient” in the welfare economics sense, that is, whether it maximizes overall
social welfare. 75 While it is probably true that a regulation that produces more total
costs than total benefits is inefficient, the converse is not true. Just because a single
regulation passes a benefits-exceed-costs test does not necessarily mean that it is
efficient. 76 Indeed, it may fall far short of efficiency.
Imagine, for example, that the efficient level of regulation (that would be
identified by a perfect Economic CBA) would reduce national emissions of some air
pollutant from forty-eight to fifteen tons per year, would cost society $5 billion per
year, and would produce $25 billion per year in social benefits, thus producing $20
billion in net benefits. While this is the only level of regulation that would satisfy a
formal Economic CBA, many other alternatives could meet the simple benefitsexceed-costs criterion for a litmus-test CBA. A regulation that reduced emissions by
just one ton—from forty-eight to forty-seven tons per year—might still produce total
benefits that significantly outweighed total costs. It might cost $1 billion and
produce $5 billion in benefits, for example. In that case, it would pass the simple
benefits-exceed-costs test with flying colors, but it would not be efficient because it
would not maximize net benefits. It would produce only $4 billion in net benefits,
compared with the $20 billion produced by the more stringent regulation. 77 Thus, a

75

See. BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 13 (distinguishing between the decision
rule for CBA of a single alternative—go forward if net social benefits are positive—and
CBA of multiple alternatives, which chooses the alternative with the highest net social
benefit); RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 642 (2004) (arguing for
welfare maximization approach to CBA).
76
TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 66
(1984) (observing, with respect to a benefits-exceed-costs test: while this test “guarantee[s]
that no activity which confers more costs on society than benefits will be undertaken, [it]
do[es] not guarantee efficiency. . . . [E]fficiency is attained when the marginal value of
benefits equals the marginal value of costs.”); Keohane, supra note 72, at 49 (“Simply
calculating total benefits and costs does not shed light on marginal benefits and costs,
which—as any economics student knows—must be equated to satisfy efficiency.”) An
informal litmus-test CBA does, by definition, move closer toward the goal of efficiency
(assuming some accuracy in cost/benefit estimation), but does not necessarily achieve net
benefits maximization. See supra note 29.
77
Because of this asymmetry, a simple total-benefits-exceed-total-costs CBA may—
on a fairly reasonable set of assumptions about the shapes of the marginal cost and benefit
curves—produce what Professor Driesen has called a “one-way ratchet,” tending always to
push regulation toward less stringency but not in the opposite direction. See Driesen, supra
note 8, at 380. This is because a regulation that fails a simple litmus-test CBA is usually one
that is too stringent. A regulation that errs in the other direction, on the other hand—one that
is too lenient—will likely produce positive net benefits, just less of them than an efficient
regulation would have produced. Accordingly, a too-lenient regulation will often pass a
litmus-test CBA, while a too-stringent regulation will fail. See Sinden, supra note 32, at 15
n.28.
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CBA that falls on the informal end of Axis 3 (measures only a single alternative)
provides a very poor proxy for efficiency.
***
In sum, we can envision different forms of CBA as falling along a spectrum
from an informal Ben Franklin CBA to a highly formal Economic CBA. We can
arrange the various characteristics of formal and informal CBA along three axes that
describe the level of quantification and monetization, the precision with which costs
and benefits are compared, and the number of alternatives considered. This typology
reveals three important insights. First, the three axes are not entirely independent.
Rather, a move along one axis will often require a parallel move along neighboring
axes. Second, where some benefits (or costs) are not only unquantifiable but also
unknown (i.e., cannot be described in even qualitative terms), CBA may fail
altogether. That is to say, no meaningful comparison under even a rough, imprecise
Axis 2 formula will be possible. Third, formal and informal CBAs perform
significantly different functions in decisionmaking. Economic CBA serves as a
standard setting tool, choosing the efficient level of regulation from all possible
alternatives. Ben Franklin CBA and other informal varieties, in contrast, act only as
a litmus test or secondary check on standard setting decisions that have been made
by other means.
It is important to be clear about the distinctions and relationships between
different forms of CBA and about the roles and capacities of each. Unfortunately,
this kind of clarity has been largely missing from the debate. Instead, scholars and
policymakers have tended to treat CBA as a monolithic concept. And, as the next
section shows, to the extent they have made note of these distinctions, they have
tended to follow an odd pattern: CBA skeptics stress CBA’s formality while
proponents stress its informality.
III. FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY IN THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
The debate over the role of CBA in evaluating regulation has raged for decades.
Proponents of CBA promote it as a means of rationalizing agency decisionmaking,
counteracting the influence of special interests, and increasing transparency. 78
Opponents charge that it fails to adequately account for transcendent and intangible
values, that it suffers from hopeless limitations on data and scientific
understandings, and that it obfuscates and obscures relevant issues rather than
promoting transparency. 79
Often, this debate proceeds in reference simply to “cost-benefit analysis” as a
generic and undefined, or perhaps presumed-to-be-self-evident, concept. But if we

78

See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 27.
See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8–9 (2004).
79
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examine the literature with an ear tuned specifically to the variety of forms that CBA
can take, a peculiar pattern emerges. When proponents do take the time to describe
or define CBA, they often emphasize its informality. Conversely, when skeptics do
so, they stress its formality.
A. CBA Proponents
Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, in the academic writings he published
before being appointed as President Barack Obama’s “regulatory czar” in charge of
OIRA, described what he was advocating for as a “modest” form of CBA. 80 This
“modest CBA” probably falls somewhere in the middle of the formality spectrum. 81
With respect to Axis 1, he urged that costs and benefits “should be translated into
monetary equivalents” wherever possible, 82 but he also acknowledged that
“[q]uantification will be difficult or even impossible in some cases,” and that in such
cases, effects should be described in qualitative terms. 83 With respect to Axis 2, his
balancing formula is also in the middle of the spectrum: “[A]n agency should be
required to conclude, in ordinary circumstances, that the benefits [of a regulation]
justify the costs.” 84 For him, the “justify” formulation “ordinarily” requires a
showing that the monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs, but exceptions are
allowed where the agency can “explain” that it is an “unusual” case involving, for

80

Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 253 (1996).
81
Indeed, Sunstein’s form of CBA is apparently hard to pigeonhole. Commenters seem
to disagree about whether his preferred variety of CBA is “softer” or “stronger.” Compare
Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (1998) (calling what
Sunstein promoted a “‘soft’ version” of CBA), and FARBER, supra note 9, at 93 (same), with
Cannon, supra note 9, at 429 (identifying Sunstein as a proponent of what he calls the
“strong” (i.e., more formal) form of CBA). This difference in view may perhaps simply
reflect the fact that Sunstein’s views have changed over time. See infra note 87.
82
SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 20.
83
Id. at 21; see also SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 111 (“The quantitative
description should supplement rather than displace a qualitative description of relevant
effects.”).
84
SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 21. The “justify” formulation for
balancing costs and benefits is the one that appears in the current executive orders requiring
agencies to conduct CBA of major federal regulations, though an earlier executive order put
in place by President Reagan in 1981 originally required benefits to “outweigh” costs. See
infra notes 219–220 and accompanying text.
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example, risks to young children. 85 With respect to Axis 3, he was not explicit, but
appeared to envision evaluation of a single alternative. 86
The important point here is that in describing his “modest” brand of CBA,
Professor Sunstein went to great pains to emphasize its informality and flexibility:
None of this suggests that the government should be rigidly bound by
the “bottom line.” Cost-benefit analysis ought not to place agencies in an
arithmetic straightjacket. The benefits should ordinarily be required to
exceed the costs, but regulators might reasonably decide that the numbers
are not decisive if, for example, children are mostly at risk, or if the
relevant hazard is faced mostly by poor people, or if the hazard at issue is
involuntarily incurred or extremely difficult to control. 87
Similarly, John Graham, former administrator of OIRA under President George
W. Bush, has distinguished between “soft” and “hard” CBA in his academic
writings, advocating for use of the “soft” version. 88 Like Professor Sunstein’s
“modest” CBA, Graham’s “soft” CBA does not require full quantification or
monetization and does not require a precise balancing of costs and benefits: “[A]
nonefficiency claim (e.g., a fairness concern or equity consideration) can contribute
to a determination that the benefits of a rule do, or do not, justify the costs.” 89 Thus,

85

Id. Professor Sunstein also suggested that, at least when courts review whether a
regulation meets a cost-benefit test, the balancing formula should be relatively imprecise and
informal: “[C]osts [should] not be grossly disproportionate to benefits,” a balancing standard
well toward the informal end of Axis 2. SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 120.
86
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 21 (“If, for example, a
regulation is expected to save 80 lives, each valued at $6 million, and if it would cost $200
million, it is fully justified.”).
87
Id. at 22; accord SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 106–07; see also
Jonathan B. Wiener, Best Cass Scenario, 43 TULSA L. REV. 933, 934 n.13 (2008)
(“Sunstein’s cognitive approach to cost-benefit analysis . . . harkens back to Benjamin
Franklin’s ‘prudential algebra’ for making considered decisions that weigh the pros and cons
. . . .”). But see Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1726–28 (2002) (criticizing Professor Sunstein for allowing regulators
to allow nonquantified factors to sometimes trump the numerical results of CBA and for
allowing rights and irreversibility to trump). In his recent writings since stepping down as
OIRA director, Professor Sunstein appears to have backed away some from this embrace of
informality, stressing instead the importance of quantification and monetization and
maximizing net benefits. See infra notes 310–313 and accompanying text.
88
Graham, supra note 2, at 432–38. Even Graham’s “hard” CBA does not meet all the
requirements for Economic CBA, because it imposes only a litmus-test CBA, rather than
identifying the point at which marginal costs equal marginal benefits.
89
Id. at 433; see also Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under
Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97, 101 (1987) (distinguishing between CBA in the
“narrow sense” and a broader form and endorsing the broader form: “What I mean by costbenefit analysis is simply a weighing of all the desirable effects of a proposed action against
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both Professor Sunstein and Professor Graham recognize that there may be multiple
forms of CBA but explicitly endorse a more informal variety.
Alternatively, some proponents of CBA blur the line between formal and
informal CBA and thus appropriate some of the universal appeal of Ben Franklin to
the project of advocating for more formal CBA. Judge Stephen Williams of the D.C.
Circuit, for example, long a proponent of formal CBA in agency decisionmaking, 90
has, in both his opinions and his academic writings, argued for CBA’s rationality by
equating it with Ben Franklin’s prudential algebra. 91 Many others have done the
same. Here’s one example:
An analytical technique explicitly relied upon by Benjamin Franklin and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, cost-benefit analysis is as old as rational thought.
All deliberative decisions involve a weighing of the advantages (benefits)
and disadvantages (costs) of a contemplated course of action. 92
And here’s another:
While the Constitution does not mandate cost-benefit analysis, such a
mode of thinking was not unknown to the Framers. Benjamin Franklin
recommended that individuals consider courses of action by writing down
all their advantages and disadvantages . . . . 93
By invoking Ben Franklin, either explicitly or implicitly, these authors present
CBA as “the soul of rationality” and common sense. 94 Kip Viscusi, an economist
and prominent proponent of formal CBA, calls CBA “straightforward” and
“intuitively appealing” and suggests that the only alternative is for regulators to

all the undesirable effects, whether or not they are susceptible of being expressed in
economic terms.”).
90
See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991). For a
discussion of this case, see infra notes 201–208 and accompanying text.
91
Stephen F. Williams, Cost-Benefit Analysis Colloquy: Squaring the Vicious Circle,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 270 (2001) (“[I]f you accept the basic Ben Franklin preference for
net benefit, then you must in some way consider costs and compare them with benefits; that’s
the only way you can get to net benefit.”); Int’l Union, 938 F.2d at 1319–21 (invoking Ben
Franklin: “‘Reasonableness’ has long been associated with the balancing of costs and
benefits. . . . [C]ost-benefit analysis entails only a systematic weighing of pros and cons, or
what Benjamin Franklin referred to as a ‘moral or prudential algebra.’”).
92
David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV. 291, 310 (2008) (citations omitted).
93
John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J.
901, 940 n.177 (2001) (defending CBA of federal regulations as required in Executive Order
12,866); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 123, 123–24
(Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013) (equating CBA with Ben Franklin’s
“prudential algebra”).
94
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 35.
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“abandon rational thought about policy impacts and rely on their instincts.” 95
Professors Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore claim that “the use of costbenefit analysis is a requirement of basic rationality” 96 and warn that the only other
choice is to “abandon reasoned analysis” and descend into “gut-level
decisionmaking.” 97 Professor Sunstein uses similar terms in arguing for his more
“modest” form of CBA, telling us “the antonym to regulation guided by cost-benefit
analysis is . . . regulation that amounts to a stab in the dark.” 98
This kind of rhetoric was particularly evident in the briefing before the U.S.
Supreme Court in Riverkeeper, a case that brought the issue of CBA in
environmental rulemaking before the Court in 2009. 99 Industry associations, the
federal government, and their supporting amici, argued in favor of the EPA’s use of
CBA and portrayed CBA as informal and casual. In some instances they avoided the
term “cost-benefit analysis” altogether, referring instead to “a comparison of costs
and benefits” or a consideration of the relationship “between costs and benefits.” 100

95

W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1436, 1439

(1996).
96
REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 12; see also Shi-Ling Hsu, On the Role of
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Law: A Book Review of Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling’s Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything & the Value of Nothing, 35
ENVTL. L. 135, 137–38 (2005) (“[A]ll would agree that [CBA] is a way of introducing some
rationality into [the] legislative and regulatory process . . . .”); Int’l Union, 938 F.2d at 1319–
21 (“‘Reasonableness’ has long been associated with the balancing of costs and benefits.”);
Shabman & Stephenson, supra note 46, at 382 (“Benefit-cost analysis has been defended as
a universal stance of rationality . . . .”).
97
REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 3; see also id. at 4 (stating that rejecting CBA
is equivalent to “rejecting reason”); id. at 16 (stating CBA brings “increased rationality to
federal regulation”). Indeed, the title of Professors Revesz’s and Livermore’s book, Retaking
Rationality, which argues that progressives should embrace CBA, essentially equates CBA
with rationality.
98
SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra note 2, at 107; see also THEODORE M. PORTER,
TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 119 (1995)
(“A favorite rhetoric surrounding the measurement of benefits and costs naturalizes it as the
form of analysis spontaneously used by rational economic actors.”). But see GRAMLICH,
supra note 1, at 5 (stating that the idea “that [CBA] is a mechanical substitute for common
sense” is a “common misconception[]” and that “[n]othing could be further from the truth”).
A number of CBA supporters also try to soften its edges by presenting it as a decision
“procedure” that provides information to decision makers, but does not necessarily dictate
outcomes. See, e.g., Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1498; see also ADLER & POSNER,
supra note 17, at 62–100; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 138
(1997); REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 15 (CBA should be only one of several inputs
into public policy); Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 221–22; see also Rowell, supra note 57, at
741 (“It is by no means obvious that cost-benefit analysis should be the sole determinant of
legal policy. . . .”).
99
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
100
See Brief for Petitioners Entergy Corp. at 39, 55, Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (Nos.
07-588, 07-589, 07-597), 2008 WL 2753247, at *39, *55; Brief for the AEI Center for
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The Justice Department’s brief equated the EPA’s use of CBA with common sense,
rationality, 101 and reasonableness, 102 calling what agencies do “conceptually
similar” to the common sense weighing of costs and benefits that individuals do, 103
which is common “in human experience generally.” 104 Entergy Corporation’s brief
called CBA “nothing more than common sense—the imperative of basic rationality
to ensure that actions do more good than harm.” 105
And, of course, there was the inevitable appeal to Ben Franklin. The amicus
brief filed by the American Enterprise Institute on behalf of a group of economists
supporting the EPA’s use of CBA opened its argument section this way: “The
general concept of comparing benefits and costs is familiar and long standing.
Indeed, in 1772, Benjamin Franklin wrote in a letter about a method for making
private decisions . . . that illustrates the basic features of benefit-cost
assessments.” 106 That brief never used the term “cost-benefit analysis” at all—
preferring the more innocuous term “benefit-cost comparisons.” 107 Additionally, it
emphasized the fact that “[n]ot all impacts of a decision can be quantified or
expressed in dollar terms” and that CBA should “give due consideration to factors
that defy quantification but are thought to be important.” 108
There are also plenty of counterexamples—proponents of CBA who advocate
a highly formal brand of CBA. 109 Many of these counterexamples come from the

Regulatory and Market Studies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners passim,
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597), 2008 WL 2817679 [hereinafter
Brief for the AEI Center].
101
Brief for Petitioners Entergy Corp., supra note 100, at 4 (describing CBA as
“further[ing] rational decisionmaking”); Brief for the AEI Center, supra note 100, at 6.
102
Brief for Petitioners Entergy Corp., supra note 100, at 30 (“[A]ny reasonable
judgment will ordinarily be based on some kind of weighing of costs and benefits . . . .”)
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1694
(2001)).
103
Brief for the Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 14,
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597), 2008 WL 2753248 at *14.
104
Id. at 13–14 (“In everyday life, people routinely weigh costs against benefits in
deciding whether to do something.”).
105
Brief for Petitioner Entergy Corp., supra note 100, at 29. Indeed, Entergy argued
that “cost-benefit analysis is always reasonable. Cost-benefit analysis (and particularly the
modest form employed by EPA here) is essentially just another way of describing common
sense or basic rationality.” Id. at 56; see Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Ben Franklin,
and the Supreme Court, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1175, 1185 (2014).
106
Brief for the AEI Center, supra note 100, at 6.
107
See id. passim.
108
Id. at 12–13.
109
See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Law and
Economics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23888
83, archived at http://perma.cc/QD47-3S27 (“Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the basis for formal
cost-benefit analysis.”); Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146
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economics literature. 110 For example, there have been a number of studies in recent
years by economists purporting to measure the quality of agency CBAs. These
studies employ criteria that essentially assume a good CBA equals a formal CBA. 111
Nonetheless, it is worth noting the significant strand of pro-CBA scholarship—much
of it from some of CBA’s most prominent advocates—that emphasizes instead the
informality of CBA.
B. CBA Skeptics
On the other hand, those who attack CBA, to the extent they define it at all,
tend to stress its formality. Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling
criticize what they refer to as “formal cost-benefit analysis” 112 and “narrow

U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1378–79 (1998) (defining the procedure of CBA in terms that put it at
the most formal end of the spectrum—requiring full quantification in a common metric of
costs and benefits of multiple options in order to identify the point of net benefits
maximization—though arguing against a normative grounding in Kaldor-Hicks efficiency);
Rowell, supra note 57, at 723 (arguing that CBA should not include nonmonetized benefits);
Cole, supra note 35, at 59 (defining CBA in terms of net benefit maximization).
110
See, e.g., Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 221–22 (arguing that CBA should identify
the point at which “the incremental benefits from regulation are just offset by the incremental
costs,” that “[b]enefits and costs . . . should be quantified wherever possible . . . [and] [i]n
most instances, it should be possible to describe the effects of proposed policy changes in
quantitative terms,” and that “[f]ormal benefit-cost analysis . . . can greatly improve the
process and, hence, the outcome of policy analysis”).
111
See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics:
Benefit-Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189, 197 (2012) (using
a set of indicators developed by OIRA as criteria for good CBA, including
quantification/monetization of costs and benefits, analysis of alternatives, and discounting);
Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008,
32 RISK ANALYSIS 855, 856, 859 (2012) (evaluating quality of CBAs of “economically
significant” rules reviewed by OIRA in 2008 using “evaluation criteria . . . drawn from
Executive Order 12866 and [OMB] Circular A-4,” including “[d]id the agency maximize net
benefits”?); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved
Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 67, 72 (2008) (using OMB guidelines and
Arrow et al., supra note 3, as a benchmark for good CBA); Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M.
Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL.
ECON. & POL’Y 192, 197 (2007) (using Executive Order 12,866 and OMB guidance as a
benchmark, including requirements of quantification “to the fullest extent possible,”
assessment of “all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives,” and “selecting the
regulatory approach that maximizes net benefits” (citations omitted)). Similarly, in the
political realm, formality in CBA is sometimes equated with “rigor.” See Robert P. Bartlett,
III, The Institutional Framework for Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale
of Four Paradigms 9 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus., and Econ., 2013), available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488077,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/55LJ-G3H5.
112
ACKERMAN AND HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 9.
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economic analysis,” 113 decrying CBA’s “atomistic and reductionist approach.”114
Professor Doug Kysar describes CBA as grounded in the economic concept of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and “select[ing] the point of marginal equivalence between
social costs and benefits.” 115 Professor David Driesen describes CBA as fully
quantified and monetized—it “consists of estimates of the regulation’s costs and of
the monetary value economists associate with the harms the regulation will
avoid.” 116
Indeed, much of opponents’ criticism of CBA centers on the quantification and
monetization of costs and benefits. They argue that certain values, like human lives
or endangered species, are simply incommensurable with money and therefore
simply cannot—or should not—be shoehorned into a monetary metric. 117 They
argue that quantification is simply impossible as a practical matter because of gross
inadequacies in data and scientific understandings of things like the health effects of
toxic chemicals or the impacts of rising temperatures on ecosystems. They argue
that expressing everything in dollar terms devalues the preferences of the poor
because each dollar is worth more to a poor person than a rich person. 118 They argue
that using a discount rate to convert monetary values representing future benefits
into present net values devalues the lives of future generations in ways that breach
fundamental ethical norms. 119 All of these problems only arise when the analyst tries
to quantify costs and benefits and translate them into a monetary metric—one of the
hallmarks of formal CBA.
Indeed, many of CBA’s harshest critics don’t object to informal Ben Franklin
CBA at all. Professors Sidney Shapiro and Christopher Schroeder, longtime
opponents of CBA, actually invoke Ben Franklin’s prudential algebra themselves as
a model for their proposed alternative to (formal) CBA. 120 Professors Ackerman and

113

Id. at 8.
Id. at 211.
115
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 104 (2010); see also Sinden, Defense of Absolutes, supra note
2, at 1413–23 (tracing the development of CBA over the course of the twentieth century,
from limited pragmatic method used by the Army Corps of Engineers, to analyzing the
construction costs and electricity production benefits of dams, to the highly theorized,
extensively elaborated branch of welfare economics that attempts to quantify and monetize
all social values related to policies).
116
Driesen, supra note 8, at 339.
117
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 7–9, 211–12.
118
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 401–07 (1981).
119
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 580 (2004); see Revesz, supra note 34, at
988–1006; Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 40–41.
120
Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 2, at 497 (stating that their alternative “more
closely resembles Ben Franklin’s prudential algebra than the reductive rationality attempted
by CBA”).
114
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Heinzerling similarly endorse an informal balancing of costs and benefits and
distinguish it from the formal CBA that they criticize:
[A]nalysis of costs and benefits, in lowercase letters, is an essential part of
any systematic thought about public policy, and has always been involved
in government decision making. Our criticism concerns the much
narrower doctrine of Cost-Benefit Analysis, which calls for a specific,
controversial way of expressing and thinking about costs and benefits. 121
I have also previously argued in favor of “limited cost-benefit analysis”—a
rough apples-to-oranges balancing that is one of a series of “short-cut standards”
that Congress adopted in the environmental legislation of the 1970s in order to avoid
the problems and pitfalls associated with formal CBA. 122 Professor Alexander
Volokh, who criticizes CBA from a libertarian perspective, takes a similar view,
noting that “[f]ormal cost-benefit analysis—which is just one of many possible
implementations of cost-benefit analysis—is much more controversial, and its
theoretical basis is much less defensible than the intuitive kind we do all the time.” 123
***
Two things seem to be going on here. First, a number of prominent authors and
policymakers who advocate CBA promote a more informal version—or at least a
middle-of-the-spectrum CBA—while a number of the most prominent skeptics do
not object to the most informal forms of CBA. This suggests that, if there is any
room for agreement, it is more likely to be found at the informal end of the spectrum,
while formal versions of CBA remain highly controversial. 124 To the extent this is

121

ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 79, at 211 (citations omitted).
Sinden, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 184–192; see also Wendy E. Wagner,
The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed up as Policy Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 56, 76–77 (arguing, in the context of the EPA’s 2005
Clean Air Interstate Rule, for an informal CBA—or “mixed quantitative-qualitative” CBA—
that would have “list[ed] the aggregated costs . . . on one side compared against the
significant quantified and unquantified (but not monetized) benefits, presented on the other
side”).
123
Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism? The Positive and Normative Flaws
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011); see also FARBER, supra note 9, at
93, 114–23 (advocating a hybrid scheme that uses a “soft CBA” as a kind of backstop to a
feasibility analysis); ANDERSON, supra note 33, at 215 (acknowledging that “any rational
evaluation of policies must take account of their costs and benefits,” but arguing that “these
facts are best presented qualitatively” and “in disaggregated form,” and that “[t]he
willingness-to-pay measure of value must be rejected”).
124
See Cannon, supra note 9, at 455 (noting that informal CBA—what he calls “the
weak form of CBA”—has “broad intuitive appeal” and “does not provoke the level of
resistance or skepticism that currently attaches to the strong form of CBA”).
122
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true, one might expect to see agencies inclined to move toward less formal versions
of CBA in order to avoid controversy—at least to the extent allowed by Congress
and the courts.
Second, some CBA proponents appear to invoke Ben Franklin and his mantle
of rationality and common sense in arguing for more formal modes of CBA. The
analysis in Part II pointing out the important distinctions between formal and
informal CBA suggests that this kind of argument is inappropriate and serves to
muddy the debate. I will examine this point more closely in Part VI.
Having examined the academic debate through the lens of formality and
informality, the next order of business is to look at the law through the same lens.
To what extent have Congress and federal courts cabined agency discretion with
respect to where along the formality-informality spectrum their CBAs lie?
IV. CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: THE TREND TOWARD INFORMALITY
Congress has in most instances actually rejected CBA as a decisionmaking
rubric for environmental health and safety regulation, directing agencies to instead
use feasibility or health-based standards. And the courts have largely upheld that
approach, in some instances going so far as to adopt a default rule disfavoring the
use of CBA. In those instances where Congress and the courts have endorsed or
allowed agency use of CBA, however, it has usually been of a fairly informal variety.
There have been a few notable departures from this pattern in some circuit courts
starting in the early 1990s, which, several years ago, might have been read to signal
an incipient trend toward formality in the courts. But the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009
decision in Riverkeeper, endorsing informality and expressing considerable
skepticism about more formal varieties of CBA, certainly bucked, and perhaps
weakened, any such trend.
A. Congress
In the 1970s, when most of our federal environmental laws were passed,
Congress was highly skeptical of CBA. 125 Members of Congress worried that
pervasive scientific uncertainties and the difficulties inherent in attempting to
monetize intangible values would make any meaningful quantification and
comparison of costs and benefits impossible. 126 They worried that agencies would
spin their wheels and spend vast resources chasing the holy grail of the accurate,
uncontestable, and determinate CBA, and produce instead only regulatory

125
See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 363–64 (4th ed. 2003); SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., FEDERAL REGULATION AND
REGULATORY REFORM 510–15 (Comm. Print 1976).
126

See Sinden, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 184–85.
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paralysis. 127 Accordingly, in crafting our major environmental statutes, Congress in
almost every instance 128 rejected CBA. 129 Instead, Congress directed agencies to set
standards via either feasibility criteria, 130 which limit environmental degradation to

127

See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1283–
84 (1985).
128
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1972
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012), the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–97 (2012), and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996
(SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (2012), are the only prominent exceptions. FIFRA and
the TSCA have been called “two of the least successful statutes of the environmental
decade.” Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2343
(2002). The cost-benefit criterion has arguably made them unwieldy and difficult to
administer, producing exactly the kind of regulatory paralysis that Congress worried about
in other contexts. Id. Indeed, since the Fifth Circuit’s 1991 decision overturning the EPA’s
asbestos ban on the ground that its CBA was inadequate, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991), discussed infra notes 183 to 192 and accompanying
text, TSCA has come to a grinding halt. The EPA has yet to ban a single chemical under
TSCA. 3 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §§ 16:3–16:4 (Sheldon M. Novick et al.
eds., 2011).
129
See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 32 (2003); Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality,
Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental
Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160–61 (1983); Sinden, Endangered Species,
supra note 2, at 184–92, 197–210; Lynn E. Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation of
Economic Analysis of the Law and Its Consequences for Environmental Policymaking, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 238–40.
130
Feasibility standards—also known as technology-based standards—are common in
American environmental law. See generally David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that the
feasibility principle offers a rational alternative to CBA); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph
of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 86 (defending technology-based
standards as “one of the most important innovations in U.S. environmental law”); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based
Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (critiquing Professor Sunstein’s arguments for the use of
CBA instead of technology-based standards).
Feasibility criteria are distinct from cost-benefit analysis because they do not require a
comparison of costs to benefits. See Winston Harrington, The Cooling Water Intake
Structures Rule, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 160, 161.
Once an agency (or Congress) determines that the benefits of regulation exceed some
threshold, the feasibility principle directs the agency to make the standard as stringent as
technologically possible without imposing costs that cannot be reasonably borne by the
industry.
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the lowest level economically and technically feasible, or health-based criteria, 131
which look only at impacts on human or ecological health and prohibit any
consideration of costs. 132
In the few instances in which Congress has authorized agency use of CBA in
setting environmental standards, it has not been particularly clear about the level of
formality it intends the agencies to use. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), for example,
are both frequently cited as the classic cost-benefit balancing statutes. 133 Yet neither
one ever uses the term “cost-benefit analysis,” or even “cost-benefit balancing.”
Instead, they simply direct the EPA to apply a “reasonableness” criterion in setting
standards. 134 The courts have inferred that determining whether a standard is
“reasonable” requires some comparison of costs and benefits. 135 But Congress has
certainly not made clear how formal that analysis needs to be.
Some pieces of the legislative history of TSCA indicate that Congress intended
only a relatively informal analysis and was somewhat wary of formal CBA. The
House committee report expressed Axis 1 reservations, noting that a “formal benefitcost analysis . . . would not be very useful” given the difficulties of assigning
monetary values to the costs and benefits of chemical regulation. 136 The Senate
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Two prominent examples are the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531–44
(2012), and the provision for the establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
132
See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2014) (identifying CBA, healthbased standards, and feasibility standards as the “three principal approaches for determining
the stringency of environmental protection”).
133
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 125, at 455–59.
134
See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012) (authorizing the EPA to regulate toxic chemicals
that “present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); id. §
2605(c)(1)(D) (directing the EPA to assess the economic benefits of the chemical to society
and the “economic consequences” of the regulation in order to evaluate the unreasonableness
of a risk); 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2012) (directing the EPA to deny registration to any pesticide
that poses an “unreasonable risk to man or the environment”).
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2089 (2012), uses
similar language, authorizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to promulgate rules
“reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury.” Id. §
2058(f)(3)(A). The CPSA also requires the Commission to publish a “description of the
potential benefits and potential costs of the proposed rule, including any benefits or costs
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms,” id. § 2058(c)(1), and the costs and benefits of
“any reasonable alternatives,” id. § 2058(c)(4), and to make a finding that “the benefits
expected from the rule bear a reasonable relationship to its costs,” id. § 2058(f)(3)(E). As
discussed in more detail below, courts have interpreted this language to require only informal
CBA. See infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
135
See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991).
136
COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT,
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 14 (1976).
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committee report expressed concerns about Axis 2 as well, stating “[i]n comparing
risks, costs, and benefits, . . . it is important to recognize that one is weighing
noncommensurates, and it is not feasible to reach a decision just on the basis of
quantitative comparisons.” 137 Despite these statements, a landmark Fifth Circuit
opinion—discussed more fully in the next section—took a very different view,
striking down the EPA’s asbestos ban under TSCA for employing an insufficiently
formal version of CBA. 138
The legislative history of FIFRA contains evidence that Congress may have
had in mind a less formal CBA under that statute as well. FIFRA requires the EPA
to deny registration to any pesticide that will cause “any unreasonable risk to man
or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental
costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.” 139 The Senate Commerce Committee
created this standard and stated that it thereby “intended that any adverse effect
ought not to be tolerated unless there are overriding benefits from the use of a
pesticide.” 140 This language could be construed to suggest a version of the “wholly
disproportionate” test and, thus, a CBA situated well toward the informal end of
Axis 2. 141
Similarly, in directing the EPA to set the first interim set of standards for
pollution discharges under the Clean Water Act, Congress called for CBA but
seemed to contemplate a relatively informal version. The statute directed the EPA
to consider “the total cost [imposed on industry by the standards] . . . in relation to
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved.” 142 Senator Edmund Muskie, the
principal sponsor of the Act in the Senate, described this as a “limited balancing

137
S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, S. REP. NO. 94-698,
at 13 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4503 (indicating an expectation that the
EPA give “full consideration” to the “burdens of human suffering and premature death”);
see also id. at 8, 10, 20, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4498, 4500, 4510 (emphasizing statutory
language at 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(D) that limits the EPA’s consideration to those
“economic consequences” that are “reasonably ascertainable”); id. at 82, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4532 (noting that language in TSCA requiring consideration of economic impacts was
included “in lieu of proposals [that would have provided for] the mandatory preparation of
detailed economic impact statements”).
138
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30.
139
7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).
140
S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PESTICIDE CONTROL ACT OF
1972, S. REP. NO. 92-970, at 11 (1972); see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 451 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that the Senate Commerce Committee was “environmentally
inclined” and that this “language was perceived as tightening criteria for registration” above
the looser language that had been adopted in the House bill).
141
See Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Ecopragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105,
177 (2006); see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 129, at 39 (characterizing FIFRA
as containing an “open-ended balancing standard”).
142
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012); see also § 1311(b)(1)(A) (requiring adoption of
the “best practicable control technology currently available”).
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test” that was only intended to affect the standard “where the additional degree of
effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs.” 143 This is the standard
used as an example in Part II above. It is situated well toward the informality end of
the spectrum along all three axes. And, as the next section explains, the case law has
read this provision consistently with this legislative history as requiring only an
informal CBA.
The only exception is the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), as amended in
1996, but even there Congress did not appear to contemplate the most formal version
of CBA. In setting maximum contaminant levels for sources of drinking water, the
SDWA requires the EPA to assess the “[q]uantifiable and nonquantifiable” costs and
benefits associated with each alternative being considered. 144 Here, then, unlike the
other statutes, Congress made specific reference to costs, benefits, and
quantification. The statute also uses language that appears to reference economic
theory, specifically giving the EPA authority to “identify valid approaches for the
measurement and valuation of benefits . . . including . . . consumer willingness to
pay for reductions in health risks from drinking water contaminants.” 145 But the
statute stops short of actually requiring the EPA to base its decision on CBA. Indeed,
the statute actually directs the EPA to set the maximum contaminant level in the first
instance on the basis of a feasibility standard. 146 It then gives the EPA the discretion,
if it so chooses, to override the results of the feasibility analysis and adjust the level
on the basis that “the benefits of a maximum contaminant level . . . would not justify
the costs . . . .” 147 Thus, while the SDWA arguably authorizes a more formal variety
of CBA, it does not require the EPA to actually base its decision on that CBA.

143
ENVTL. POL’Y DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93RD CONG., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 170, 1466
(Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
(“The Committee recognizes that no mathematical balance can be achieved in considering
relative costs and benefits nor would any precise formula be desirable . . . .”).
144
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (2012).
145
Id. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(iii); see also id. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)(IV) (requiring the EPA
to publish an analysis of “[t]he incremental costs and benefits associated with each
alternative maximum contaminant level considered”).
146
The statute first directs the EPA to set something called a “maximum contaminant
level goal.” Id. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A). This goal is to be set according to a very stringent health
based standard—that is, “at the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the
health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety.” Id. § 300g1(b)(4)(A). It then directs the EPA to set the “maximum contaminant level,” which is the
limit that drinking water supplies are actually required to meet, “as close to the maximum
contaminant level goal as is feasible.” Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B).
147
Id. § 300g-1(b)(6)(A). This provision goes on to say that where the costs of the
chosen maximum contaminant level do not justify the benefits, the EPA “may . . . promulgate
a maximum contaminant level . . . that maximizes health risk reduction benefits at a cost that
is justified by the benefits.” Id. While this language might appear at first glance to be a
reference to net benefits maximization (economic efficiency), it actually calls for something
quite different and represents a departure from economic theory. It directs the EPA to set the
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In sum, Congress has for the most part eschewed CBA in crafting our federal
environmental statutes. In those few instances when it has directed agencies to use
CBA, it has—with limited exceptions—directed them to use only informal varieties
of CBA. 148
B. The Courts
In interpreting the federal environmental statutes, a number of federal court
decisions have largely confirmed Congress’s apparent antipathy toward CBA. 149

standard at the level at which overall benefits are as high as they can possibly be, as long as
they are cost justified. This could well be a point more stringent than the point of net benefits
maximization. In Figure 2, for example, this would be the point furthest to the right (“most
stringent” regulation). See supra fig. 2.
The D.C. Circuit also noted in City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 710–11 (D.C.
Cir. 2007), that while the SDWA requires the EPA to perform a CBA, the use of that CBA
to set the maximum contaminant level is discretionary. That case actually involved an
exception the statute carves out for cryptosporidium, which prohibits the EPA from using
the CBA override to set the maximum contaminant level for this contaminant. 42 U.S.C. §
300g-1(b)(6)(C). Congress was particularly concerned about cryptosporidium at the time,
due to a high profile and disastrous outbreak in Milwaukee three years earlier. City of
Portland, 507 F.3d at 710–11.
148
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)—not itself an environmental statute,
but one that applies to rulemaking under the environmental statutes—conforms with this
trend. 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658g, 1501–71 (2012). The UMRA, passed in 1994 as part of the
104th Congress’s “contract with America,” requires agencies to prepare CBAs of major
rules. See Victor B. Flatt, Environmental “Contraction” for America? (or How I Stopped
Worrying and Learned to Love the EPA), 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 585, 588 n.7 (1996). But
nothing in the statutory text indicates that the CBA must be particularly formal. It simply
requires a “written statement containing . . . a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the
anticipated costs and benefits.” 2 U.S.C. §1532(a).
In the National Environmental Policy Act, Congress also expressed concern with the
potential shortcomings of formal modes of analysis. In the same section of the statute that
requires federal agencies to conduct environmental impact statements where their actions
involve significant environmental effects, Congress directed all federal agencies to “identify
and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B)
(2012). The regulations interpreting that provision explicitly discourage formal CBA: “[T]he
weighing of the merits and drawbacks of various alternatives need not be displayed in a
monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be when there are important qualitative
considerations. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2014).
149
In his 2002 book, The Cost-Benefit State, Professor Sunstein attempted to make the
opposite argument, contending that the federal courts were moving toward adopting a default
rule in favor of cost-benefit analysis. See SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at
19–20. But see Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has on three occasions held particular provisions of
environmental statutes to preclude CBA, and on two of those occasions has done so
on the basis of an anti-CBA presumption, stating that unless the statute is clear, it
should be presumed to preclude CBA. 150 More recently, in Riverkeeper, the Court

150

In Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470–71 (2001), the Court held
that the text of the Clean Air Act “unambiguously bars” the EPA from using CBA to set the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards. In so doing, the Court applied an anti-CBA
presumption, holding that in the absence of a “clear” “textual commitment” to CBA, the
statute must be read as precluding CBA. See id. at 490 (Breyer, J. concurring) (reading
majority opinion as applying a “presumption that any authority . . . to consider costs must
flow from a ‘textual commitment’ that is ‘clear’” (quoting id. at 468 (majority opinion)). In
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981), the Court held that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act directs OSHA to set workplace health standards for
toxics on the basis of a feasibility test rather than CBA and indicated that this was based on
a general presumption against CBA: “When Congress has intended that an agency engage in
cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute.” Finally,
in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–88 (1978), the Court held that the
Endangered Species Act imposes absolute requirements on federal agencies and precludes
cost-benefit balancing: “The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” Id. at 184. This meant that
“in this case [the fact that] the burden on the public through the loss of millions of
unrecoverable dollars would greatly outweigh the loss of the snail darter” was not a reason
to relieve the Tennessee Valley Authority from its obligation under the Act to halt
completion of a $100 million dam in order to preserve the species. Id. at 187.
Similarly, a line of cases in the federal courts of appeals has held that CBA is not
required in setting most of the feasibility standards under the Clean Water Act. See, e.g.,
Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In applying the BAT
standard, the EPA is not obligated to evaluate the reasonableness of the relationship between
costs and benefits. . . . Indeed, the EPA may prescribe [effluent limitations guidelines] whose
costs are significantly disproportionate to their benefits, just as long as the BAT
determination remains economically feasible for the industry as a whole.” (citations
omitted)); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A] direct
cost/benefit correlation is not required [for BAT], so even minimal environmental impact
can be regulated, so long as the prescribed alternative is technologically and economically
achievable.” (citations omitted)); Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 565 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that CBA is not required for setting BAT, NSPS, PSES and PSNS standards);
Nat’l Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 n.64 (3rd Cir. 1983) (“[Under
BAT], cost is no longer considered in comparison to effluent reduction benefits. Instead, the
Administrator looks only at the cost of achieving the requisite effluent reduction.” (citations
omitted)); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(distinguishing BAT from BPT standard stating that a limited cost-benefit balancing is
required under the latter but not under the former); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329,
1341–42 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that CBA is not required in setting NSPS); Am. Paper Inst.
v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding CBA not required in setting BAT); see
also EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 70–71 & n.10 (1980) (noting in dicta
that the Clean Water Act directs the EPA not to consider costs in relation to benefits in setting
effluent limits under the Best Available Technology (BAT) standard). But see Masur &
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upheld the EPA’s discretion to use CBA if it so chooses where the statute was
ambiguous, suggesting that any apparent anti-CBA presumption arising out of the
earlier cases is not necessarily strong enough to prevent an agency that wants to from
pursuing CBA. 151
More importantly for present purposes, in those instances where courts have
upheld agency use of CBA, they have generally sanctioned an informal type. Thus,
in Riverkeeper, the Supreme Court endorsed only a fairly informal variety of CBA
and suggested that more “rigorous form[s]” of CBA might be “preclude[d].” 152 This
approach is consistent with numerous lines of earlier circuit court cases that have
rejected calls for formal CBA and encouraged agencies to use informal CBA. There
have been a few isolated exceptions to this trend, but only one case, the Fifth
Circuit’s famous decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 153 actually invalidated
an agency rule for its failure to use a more formal CBA. 154
1. Favoring Informality
The issue of CBA in environmental rulemaking came before the Supreme Court
in 2009, in Riverkeeper. This time, unlike the three prior occasions in which the
Court had addressed this issue, 155 the case involved an agency decision to adopt
CBA, rather than to reject it. Although the provision at issue—Section 316(b) of the
Clean Water Act, which regulates the intake of cooling water by power plants and
other large industrial facilities—appears to set out a standard feasibility criterion,
the EPA set the standard based on CBA instead. In a six-to-three opinion, the Court
upheld the Agency’s use of CBA. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, went to
some pains, however, to make clear that the kind of CBA he was endorsing was far
toward the informal end of the spectrum:

Posner, supra note 71, at 670 (noting that only one court of appeals—the Second Circuit—
has ever rejected an agency decision to employ CBA as exceeding the agency’s authority,
and that case was Riverkeeper, subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court, Riverkeeper,
Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S.
208, 223 (2009)).
151
See Masur & Posner, supra note 71, at 669–70. In another recent case, EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1603–04 (2014), the Supreme Court upheld the
EPA’s decision to read cost considerations into the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision
in designing the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. But this case—despite Justice Scalia’s
erroneous suggestion to the contrary, id. at 1610 (Scalia J., dissenting)—did not involve
actual cost-benefit analysis. It involved something closer to cost-effectiveness or feasibility
analysis.
152
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 223.
153
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
154
See id. at 1222–23.
155
See cases cited supra note 150.
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Other arguments may be available to preclude such a rigorous form of
cost-benefit analysis as that which was prescribed under the statute’s
former BPT standard, which required weighing “the total cost of
application of technology” against “the . . . benefits to be achieved.” But
that question is not before us.
In the Phase II requirements challenged here the EPA sought only to
avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits. 156
Thus, the majority opinion did not specify exactly what a permissible CBA
looks like, but it offered enough clues to make clear that the CBA it was endorsing
fell pretty far toward the informal end of the spectrum along all three axes. First,
Justice Scalia wrote, “[T]he EPA sought only to avoid extreme disparities between
costs and benefits . . . .” 157 This indicates informality along both Axis #2 and Axis
#3. Second, Justice Scalia said that the form of CBA he was endorsing was less
“rigorous” than that performed under the Best Practicable Control Technology
(BPT) standard, 158 which has typically not monetized benefits. 159 This puts Justice
Scalia’s CBA near the informal end of Axis 1, consistent with Justice Breyer’s view
that the EPA should describe benefits in “non-monetized terms.” 160
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized the distinction between
formal and informal CBA, clearly endorsing the latter, and highlighted the dangers
of formal CBA:
The EPA’s reading of the statute would seem to permit it to describe
environmental benefits in non-monetized terms and to evaluate both costs
and benefits in accordance with its expert judgment and scientific
knowledge. The Agency can thereby avoid lengthy formal cost-benefit
proceedings and futile attempts at comprehensive monetization; take
account of Congress’ technology-forcing objectives; and still prevent
results that are absurd or unreasonable in light of extreme disparities
between costs and benefits. 161
Thus, the CBA Justice Breyer envisioned was clearly well toward the informal end
of the spectrum along Axis 1 (describing benefits in nonmonetized terms) and Axis
2 (avoiding extreme disparities between costs and benefits). 162

156

Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 223–24 (emphasis added) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(1)(B)).
157
Id. at 224.
158
Id. at 223.
159
See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text.
160
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 235 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
162
Justice Breyer’s reading conforms with early agency interpretations of section
316(b) of the Clean Water Act. See Best Technology Available for the Location, Design,
Construction, and Capacity of Cooling Water Intake Structures, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,387, 17,388
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The Supreme Court’s expressed preference for informality in the Riverkeeper
case is consistent with the general trend in the circuits. In multiple lines of cases the
federal appeals courts have repeatedly and in many contexts endorsed informal over
formal versions of CBA.
One example is the line of cases (referenced above) interpreting the interim
BPT standard that the Clean Water Act required industrial point sources to meet by
1977. Unlike the other feasibility standards in the Act, this standard directed the EPA
to consider costs “in relation to” benefits. 163 But in interpreting it, the courts have
emphasized that the agency is to engage in only “a ‘limited’ balancing test,” and that
“cost need not be balanced against benefits with pinpoint precision.” 164 Indeed, the
circuit courts have routinely upheld CBAs under this provision that simply made an
apples-to-oranges comparison of costs measured in dollars against benefits
measured in pounds of pollution removed from a factory’s effluent. 165 In so doing,
they have recognized the Axis 1 limitations inherent in the measurement of water
pollution—that “many of the benefits resulting from the effluent reduction are
incapable of precise quantification” 166 and “often cannot be reduced to dollars and

(Apr. 26, 1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 402) (“No comparison of monetary costs with the
social benefits of minimizing adverse environmental impacts, much less a formal, quantified
‘cost/benefit’ assessment is required by the terms of the Act.”). For a more detailed analysis
of the Court’s opinion along these lines, see Sinden, supra note 105, at 1189–91.
163
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring adoption of the “best
practicable control technology currently available” that is to be determined in part by
consideration of “the total cost [imposed on industry by the standards] . . . in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved”).
164
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting
statement of Senator Muskie in legislative history); see also EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980) (quoting same language); Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA,
615 F.2d 794, 809 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing same language); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870
F.2d 177, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting same language).
165
See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1047 (estimating costs to industry as a whole
at $1.6 billion and benefits of “5,000 fewer tons per day of BOD discharged into the nation’s
waters”); Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 808–09 (noting that agency should weigh
dollar costs against amount of effluent reduction achieved); Nat’l Ass’n of Metal Finishers
v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 663 (3d Cir. 1983) (approving EPA’s CBA “calculat[ing] that the
benefits would be an effluent reduction of 140 million pounds of toxic pollutants per year,
and that the total costs would be $1.34 billion plus $425 million annually.”), rev’d on other
grounds, Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
166
Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 809; see also id. at 805 (“Congress was aware
that prior enforcement efforts based on water quality standards had not been successful. It
determined, accordingly, that the Agency should have the authority to require effluent
reduction benefits as defined by the amount or degree of reduction achieved by a level of
technology applied to discharge, without the necessity of demonstrating the incremental
effect of that technology on the quality of the receiving water.”).
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cents” 167—and thus have endorsed a “wholly disproportionate” balancing test, well
toward the informal end of Axis 2. 168
Several of these courts specifically rejected arguments by various industries
that the EPA should perform an Economic CBA under this provision. 169 In one case,
members of the American pulp and paper industry pointed to a statement in the
legislative history from the bill’s sponsor, Senator Muskie, which the EPA had also
cited in support of its contention that the statute required only a rough, unquantified
balancing of costs and benefits. 170 Senator Muskie had said, “The balancing test
between total cost and effluent reduction benefits is intended to limit the application
of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out
of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction . . . .” 171 The
EPA emphasized the phrase “wholly out of proportion,” while the industry
petitioners pointed to the phrases “additional degree” and “marginal level.” 172
The court, however, was unwilling to impose such a formal and precise
balancing formula on the EPA and rejected the argument that the use of the word
“marginal” signaled an intent for the agencies to use an Economic CBA. 173 The D.C.
Circuit worried “[a] requirement that EPA perform the elaborate task of calculating
incremental balances would bog the Agency down in burdensome proceedings on a
relatively subsidiary task.” 174

167

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1361 (4th Cir. 1976); see also Am.
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 296–97 (3d Cir. 1977) (suggesting Congress did not
require quantification of benefits); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801, 809 n.3
(4th Cir. 1982) (“The power companies simply misread this language when they argue that
as a matter of statutory interpretation the ‘benefits’ referred to in ‘effluent reduction benefits’
necessarily relate to improved receiving water quality.”).
168
See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 805; Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1045
n.52. During this time, the EPA applied the same brand of CBA in its guidelines for sitespecific permitting for cooling water intake structures under Section 316(b): directing state
permit writers to simply ensure that costs were not “wholly disproportionate” to benefits. See
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 225 (2009); Seacoast Anti-Pollution
League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 311 (1st Cir. 1979).
169
See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1041 n.41 (rejecting argument that BPT
required a CBA based on economic theory); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023,
1037–38 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting industry’s argument that the EPA should have done
incremental CBA); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 656–57 (1st Cir. 1979)
(same).
170
See Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1047.
171
Id. at 1045 n.52 (quoting WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 143, at 170).
172
Id. at 1045 n.52, 1047.
173
Id. at 1048.
174
Id.; see also 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER
432 (1986) (explaining that “cost-sensitive” standards such as BPT or BAT are far different
than standards justified by formal, monetized cost-benefit analyses, where “every dollar
spent on technology must return at least a dollar in enhanced water quality”).
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Indeed, in Weyerhaeuser, the D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the idea that
regulations should be subject to a formal CBA under the tenets of economic theory:
Apart from this simple “common sense” version of the argument,
there is a more sophisticated economic version called the “optimal
pollution” theory. This economic theory contends that there is a level or
type of pollution that, while technologically capable of being controlled,
is uneconomic to treat because the benefit from treatment is small and the
cost of treatment is large. These economic theories are premised on a view
that we have both adequate information about the effects of pollution to
set an optimal test, and adequate political and administrative flexibility to
keep polluters at that level once we allow any pollution to go untreated.
As discussed in this section, it appears that Congress doubted these
premises. 175
Similarly, a line of cases has upheld the use of CBA by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) in promulgating safety standards under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act for workplace hazards other than toxic
chemicals. OSHA issues these standards pursuant to the Act’s requirement that they
be “reasonably necessary.” 176 But here, again, the CBA sanctioned by the courts has
been of a relatively informal variety. The courts have declined to “prescribe any
rigid formula” for CBA and have repeatedly upheld agency analyses that failed to
monetize benefits. 177
Another line of cases has interpreted the authority of the Consumer Products
Safety Commission to regulate hazards that create an “unreasonable risk” of injury

175

Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1041 n.41 (citations omitted).
29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2012).
177
RMI Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Nat’l Grain
& Feed Ass’n v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 733 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The test under section 3(8) is
an intermediate one between the feasibility mandate of section 6(b)(5) and a strict costbenefit analysis that requires a more formal, specific weighing of quantified benefits against
costs.”); Asbestos Info. Ass’n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 423 n.18 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e do
not imply that the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the agency to [conduct a
formal cost-benefit analysis].”); Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d. 641, 649 (9th
Cir. 1982); Tex. Indep. Ginners Ass’n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 411 n.44 (5th Cir. 1980)
(“A requirement for formal cost-benefit analysis demands that regulatory benefits exceed
their costs. The reasonably necessary requirement in the Act only demands that the expected
costs of OSHA regulations be reasonably related to the expected benefits, leaving
considerable discretion for the agency as long as it is exercised on substantial evidence and
with an adequate statement of reasons.”); Int’l Harvester Co. v. OSHRC, 628 F.2d 982, 989–
90 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding agency’s analysis that described benefits to employees of
reduced noise exposure in completely non-monetized terms and costs in partially nonmonetized terms); Turner Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 561 F.2d 82, 86 (7th Cir. 1977) (describing
benefits in non-monetized terms).
176
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to authorize the use of CBA. 178 Here also the courts have eschewed formal CBA,
observing that the CBA conducted by the commission need not be “elaborate,” 179
and comparing it to the kind of balancing “familiar in tort law.” 180 And yet another
line of cases under the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Management Act
have similarly rejected formal CBA, holding that it is “not realistic to expect
[Fisheries Management Councils] to quantify” economic impacts of fisheries
regulation on fishing communities or to “undertake a rigorous exercise in
microeconomic analysis.” 181 Again, the analyses upheld by the courts in these cases
have involved no more than an apples-to-oranges balancing of primarily qualitative
costs and benefits. 182
Thus, while the courts have interpreted some statutes as forbidding agency use
of CBA altogether, in those cases in which the courts have authorized agency use of
CBA, they have generally called for a CBA that falls on the informal end of the
spectrum. There have been a few exceptions to this general trend, however.
2. Exceptions
The most prominent exception is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, in which the court considered an industry challenge to the EPA’s
ban on asbestos under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 183 As noted above,
there was considerable reason to conclude based on the statutory language and

178

15 U.S.C. § 1261(s) (2012); see also id. § 2058(f)(2) (2012) (barring the
Commission from issuing a new rule “unless it has prepared . . . a final regulatory analysis
of the rule containing . . . [a] description of the potential benefits and potential costs of the
rule”).
179
Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 569 F.2d 831, 840
(5th Cir. 1978).
180
Forester v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 559 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
181
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Sec’y of Commerce, 494 F. Supp. 626,
631 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“It is simply not realistic to expect the Council to quantify
foreclosures, bankruptcies, fishing accidents, and unemployment rates[, or to] . . . foresee[]
the wild gyrations in interest rates that have recently occurred. . . . [This is] an agency whose
job is to weigh broad environmental and economic elements.”); see also Alaska Factory
Trawler Ass’n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that in reviewing a
fisheries management plan for conformance with the national standards set forth in the Act,
“[t]he Secretary [of Commerce] does not have to conduct a formal cost/benefit analysis” of
the measure).
182
At least one similar decision rejecting formal CBA has come down in the context of
a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) dam relicensing decision. See
Conservation Law Found. v. FERC, 216 F.3d 41, 46–47 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding FERC’s
decision to reject a proposal to restore in-stream flows to a dammed channel based in part on
an assessment of the costs of the proposal in monetized terms juxtaposed against a
nonquantified assessment of the benefits: “Certainly, nothing in the [Federal Power Act]
requires the Commission to place a dollar value on nonpower benefits”).
183
947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
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legislative history that Congress intended the EPA to undertake only a very informal
version of CBA in setting standards under the Act. 184 Nonetheless, in a long and
detailed opinion, the Fifth Circuit struck down the EPA’s rule on the ground that its
CBA was inadequate. 185 And the opinion made clear that the CBA was inadequate
precisely because it fell too far toward the informality end of each of the three axes
identified in Part II.
The court’s first set of criticisms related to Axis 1. It faulted the Agency for
failing to more fully quantify and monetize the benefits of the regulation and for
failing to apply a discount rate to benefits, which, of course, would have required
full monetization. 186 Next, the court criticized the Agency on Axis 2 grounds for
using insufficient precision in its balancing of costs against benefits, criticizing the
Agency for essentially using a break-even analysis to conclude that unquantified
benefits were large enough to justify a finding that benefits outweighed costs, even
though monetized benefits fell significantly short of monetized costs. 187 The court
found this approach unacceptable, saying, “Unquantified benefits can, at times,
permissibly tip the balance in close cases. They cannot, however, be used to effect
a wholesale shift on the balance beam.” 188 Finally, the court specifically demanded
a move toward formality on Axis 3 as well, faulting the Agency for evaluating only
a single regulatory alternative rather than estimating costs and benefits for a whole
range of alternatives in order to maximize net benefits. 189
Consistent with the tendency in the academic debate for CBA proponents to
disavow any insistence on formality, the court stressed that the EPA need not
“engage in an exhaustive, full-scale cost-benefit analysis” 190 and asserted that “[a]n
agency may exercise its judgment without strictly relying upon quantifiable risks,
costs, and benefits . . . .” 191 But these protestations had little impact in the face of the
court’s substantive analysis. After the court remanded the case, the EPA, which had
already spent ten years preparing the first CBA, gave up entirely. The Agency never
tried to promulgate the ban on asbestos again, nor, indeed, to take any significant
regulatory action under TSCA. 192
Another U.S. Court of Appeals decision permits but does not require agency
reliance on a formal version of CBA. In Center for Biological Diversity v. National

184

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30.
186
Id. at 1218.
187
Id. at 1218–19.
188
Id. at 1219. Even though, for the rule as a whole, benefits outweighed costs, certain
aspects of the rule, when viewed in isolation, appeared to have large costs in relation to
benefits. The EPA’s calculations showed, for example, that the ban on asbestos pipe would
cost well over a hundred million dollars but save only three lives. Id.
189
Id. at 1217.
190
Id. at 1222.
191
Id. at 1214.
192
See McGarity, supra note 128, at 2343.
185
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Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 193 environmentalists challenged the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rule setting Corporate
Average Fuel Efficiency Standards (CAFE) for light trucks in model years 2008–
2011. 194 In arriving at the fuel efficiency standard, the Agency had performed a
highly formal CBA. Indeed, it had actually conducted an Economic CBA, measuring
costs and benefits for a whole range of efficiency levels and setting the standard “at
the point where marginal costs equaled marginal benefits.” 195 The environmentalists
argued that in conducting the CBA, the Agency had erred in failing to account for
the climate change benefits of increased fuel efficiency. 196 The Ninth Circuit agreed,
faulting the Agency for its failure to include a monetized value for the benefit of
reducing carbon emissions, especially given that the Agency had “monetized other
uncertain benefits.” 197
This case then is very different from Corrosion Proof Fittings, where the court
faulted the Agency for not using formal CBA. 198 Center for Biological Diversity, in
contrast, simply stands for the proposition that where an agency elects on its own to
employ a highly formal variety of CBA it must be consistent by quantifying and
monetizing all relevant benefits. 199 Thus, while permitting agency use of formal
CBA, this case certainly does not require it. Rather, it seems aimed at avoiding the
kind of false formality that I discuss in more detail in Part V—where an agency
inappropriately combines formal and informal elements of CBA in a single
analysis. 200

193

538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1180.
195
Id. at 1191. The statute itself did not explicitly call for formal CBA, or necessarily
for CBA at all. It simply directed NHTSA to set fuel economy standards at “the maximum
feasible . . . level,” and to take into account in that determination “technological feasibility,
economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards . . . on fuel economy, and
the need of the United States to conserve energy.” Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975, 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a), (f) (2012).
196
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1187–89.
197
Id. at 1202.
198
947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991).
199
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1187–89. A recent district court case
involving a challenge to an environmental impact statement issued in connection with coal
leasing on federal lands reached a similar conclusion. High Country Conservation Advocates
v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 13-CV-01723-RBJ, 2014 WL 2922751 at *10 (D. Colo. July 27,
2014) (“Even though NEPA does not require a cost-benefit analysis, it was nonetheless
arbitrary and capricious to quantify the benefits of the lease modifications and then explain
that a similar analysis of the costs was impossible when such an analysis was in fact possible
[by use of the social cost of carbon].”). For more on NEPA (the National Environmental
Policy Act), see supra note 148.
200
Professor Revesz cites Center for Biological Diversity, along with another case,
Public Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir.
2004), as examples of courts pushing agencies to quantify benefits in their CBAs. Revesz,
supra note 63. Public Citizen involved a rule issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
194
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A third case that is often cited as an example of a federal court endorsing CBA
is a D.C. Circuit opinion on OSHA’s “lock out/tag out rule” in which prominent
CBA proponent Judge Stephen Williams urged OSHA to adopt formal CBA. 201 The
views on CBA expressed by Judge Williams in that case, however, ultimately had
little effect since on remand OSHA pointedly declined his invitation to use formal
CBA.
As noted above, in the case law interpreting the Occupational Safety and Health
Act the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had already endorsed a relatively
informal version of CBA for workplace safety standards outside the context of toxic
chemicals. But in the lock out/tag out case, Judge Williams parted company with
those courts, specifically urging OSHA to instead adopt a highly formal type of
CBA. He explicitly linked the CBA he was envisioning to economic theory:
“[P]roperly conducted cost-benefit analysis should yield a solution approximating
that of a market undistorted by market failures.” 202 He also indicated that OSHA
should monetize the benefits of human lives and human health. 203 On remand,

Administration to limit the hours of truck drivers and other commercial vehicle drivers. Pub.
Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1216. The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule but not on the basis of the
Agency’s CBA. Id. In dicta, however, the court did criticize the Agency for its failure to
require electric onboard recorders (EOBRs) that would monitor compliance with the rules,
expressing skepticism, in particular, at the Agency’s proffered justification—“that the costs
and benefits of EOBRs are unknown.” Id. at 1221. This apparently prompted the Agency to
look more carefully at the CBA, and, on remand, it actually quantified both the costs and
benefits of requiring EOBRs, finding annual net benefits in the hundreds of millions of
dollars annually. Electronic On-Board Recorders and Hours of Service Supporting
Documents, 76 Fed. Reg. 5,537, 5,547–48 (Feb. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.
385, 390, 395).
Though aptly cited by Professor Revesz in the context of his argument, whether this is
an example of a court actually requiring formal CBA is less clear. Even putting aside the fact
that the CBA discussion was dicta, it is not entirely clear that the court necessarily had in
mind full quantification and/or monetization in suggesting that the Agency should
“estimat[e] the costs,” and “at least . . . attempt to analyze [the] benefits” of the rule. Pub.
Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221–22. The court did say that the statute (which contained a directive
to “consider” costs and benefits) required the Agency “to collect and analyze data on the
costs and benefits,” and “to estimate [the] benefits on imperfect empirical assumptions.” Id.
The court also acknowledged, however, that the Agency’s estimates might be “imprecise,”
and suggested that at least one factor to be weighed in the balance was the (presumably
unquantifiable) possibility that the devices “might be unduly intrusive.” Id.
201
Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
202
Id. at 1319.
203
See id. at 1320–21. Judge Williams also authored another opinion in 1991
interpreting an open-ended provision of the Clean Air Act to give the EPA discretion to use
CBA in deciding whether to exclude surface coal mines’ fugitive emissions from the
threshold for PSD permitting. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641
(D.C. Cir. 1991). In that opinion, however, Judge Williams did not make any specific
comment as to the level of formality the EPA should employ in such CBAs. See id.
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however, in a rebuke to Judge Williams, the Agency explicitly rejected what it called
the “formal cost-benefit analysis” that his opinion had urged on it. 204 OSHA argued
that problems associated with formal cost-benefit analysis militate against
its use in safety rulemaking. The formal cost-benefit analysis discussed by
the court is generally understood to require that all the costs and benefits
of a particular action be identified, monetized and compared. Each stage
of this analysis—selection of relevant costs and benefits, assignment of
monetary values, and judgment of relative worth—presents complex
policy and factual issues, the resolution of which is not necessarily more
precise or rational than resolution of the issues OSHA currently addresses
and which could result in significantly protracted agency rulemaking. 205
The ultimate legal question for the court was whether the Agency was
interpreting the statute in a way that provided sufficient guidance to withstand a
constitutional challenge under the nondelegation doctrine. 206 Thus, Judge
Williams’s opinion had not required the Agency to use formal CBA; it had merely
suggested it as “at least one interpretation” of the statute that would survive
constitutional attack. 207 When the case subsequently went back to the D.C. Circuit,
Judge Williams and the rest of the panel deferred (though somewhat grudgingly) to
the Agency, holding that its alternative interpretation did “guide[] its choice of safety
standards enough to satisfy the demands of the nondelegation doctrine.” 208
In sum, while these three cases appear to superficially endorse a more formal
version of CBA, only one actually invalidated a rule for an agency’s decision to use
informal CBA. And in the face of these few exceptions stand the numerous federal
court decisions discussed above that have eschewed formal CBA and encouraged
agencies to instead use a highly informal style of CBA much closer to the Ben
Franklin end of the spectrum. 209

204

Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout), 58 Fed. Reg. 16,612,
16,622 (Mar. 30, 1993) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
205
Id.
206
Int’l Union, 938 F.2d at 1321.
207
Id. at 1313.
208
Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also id. at 670
(“In any event, the current case does not require us to decide whether the statute requires a
reasonable relationship between a rule’s costs and its benefits.”).
209
Professor Sunstein’s theory that the federal courts have adopted a set of “cost-benefit
default rules”—explicated in his 2002 book, The Cost-Benefit State, supra note 2—is largely
consistent with this view. In making this argument, he did not distinguish between formal
and informal CBA, but a careful look at the cases behind his “default rules” shows that, in
fact, the vast majority of them endorse informal rather than formal varieties of CBA. Indeed,
many of the “cost-benefit default rules” that Professor Sunstein found in various court
opinions, in his words, “fall far short of calling for full-fledged cost-benefit analysis.”
SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE, supra note 2, at 33. Instead, they involve principles that
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While the weight of the case law certainly favors informality, some might still
argue that the trend is in the opposite direction. It is true that many of the cases
endorsing informal CBA were issued in the 1970s and 1980s, while those cases that
arguably endorse a more formal brand of CBA have occurred in the 1990s and
onward. It is possible then—though certainly far from clear—that we are seeing an
incipient trend in the federal courts toward formality in CBA. A recent D.C. Circuit
case outside the environmental arena, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 210 which has
received a lot of attention for requiring CBA of securities regulations and faulting
the Agency for not quantifying certain costs and benefits, could also be read to augur
such a trend. 211 But that opinion is not a model of clarity, and it is not at all clear
whether the court was actually demanding the kind of comprehensive monetization
that would put a CBA on the formal end of the spectrum. 212 Moreover, since

Professor Sunstein viewed as related to CBA or evidencing a CBA sensibility. Thus, he
pointed to cases authorizing agencies to make “de minimis” exceptions to regulatory
requirements, id. at 33–37, to cases requiring agencies to also consider potential
countervailing adverse health impacts when considering the health benefits of a rule, id. at
37–40, and to cases allowing agencies to consider costs without actually balancing them
against benefits, see, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Only five of the cases Professor Sunstein cited could be said to involve actual CBA. Of
these, two involved an informal Ben Franklin balancing of qualitative pros and cons. See
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); George E. Warren
Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998). One approved a CBA prepared by the EPA
that contained some indicia of formality (some monetization of costs and benefits for four
different regulatory alternatives), but left significant benefits unquantified. See Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 646–47 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Requirements for
Implementation Plans, 54 Fed. Reg. 48,870, 48,873 (Nov. 28, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51, 52). The other two cases were Judge Williams’s decision on OSHA’s lockout/tagout
rule and the Fifth Circuit’s Corrosion Proof Fittings decision, both discussed above. For an
argument that Professor Sunstein’s “cost-benefit default rules” are largely imaginary, see
Sinden, supra note 149.
210
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
211
See id. at 1150.
212
The case involved an SEC rule requiring corporate boards to include in their proxy
voting materials candidates to board vacancies nominated by shareholders. Id. at 1147. The
rule was aimed at improving shareholder democracy—a social value that, like environmental
quality and public health, is in some sense intangible. See id. at 1149. But while the court
faulted the Agency for failing to consider certain particular costs and benefits, it was not
clear that in every instance the court expected quantification. For example, one aspect of the
benefits analysis that the court found wanting was the Agency’s conclusion that the rule
would “improve board performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the
election of dissident shareholder nominees.” Id. at 1150. This was a benefit that the Agency
had described in purely qualitative terms, but the court did not suggest that the Agency
should try to quantify it. See id. Rather, the court objected to the fact that the SEC had “relied
exclusively and heavily” on two particular studies that the court found “unpersuasive.” Id. at
1151. See Coates IV, supra note 9, at 29 (criticizing the D.C. Circuit for “characteriz[ing]
(without explanation) a peer-reviewed article published in the Journal of Financial
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Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit has handed down two cases about financial
regulation that have been quite explicit in their rejection of formal CBA. 213 In the
words of the court, “An agency is not required ‘to measure the immeasurable,’ and
need not conduct a ‘rigorous, quantitative economic analysis’ unless the statute
explicitly directs it to do so.” 214 Finally, back in the environmental arena, any notion
that the handful of cases from the last two decades endorsing more formality in CBA
constitute an incipient trend is far harder to defend in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Riverkeeper, which cuts pretty clearly in the opposite direction.
In sum, courts have in a number of instances rejected agency use of CBA
altogether in setting environmental health and safety standards. And in those
instances in which courts have endorsed agency use of CBA, they have typically
sanctioned only an informal version of CBA that does not require full quantification
or monetization of costs and benefits (Axis 1), requires only a rough balancing (Axis
2), and requires analysis of only a single option in relation to the status quo (Axis
3).
V. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: BUCKING THE TREND
The law, then, does not generally push agencies in the direction of formality
and, indeed, often seems to push in the opposite direction. In light of this tendency
toward informality in Congress and the courts, along with the observations above

Economics as ‘relatively unpersuasive’”). Thus, it is not at all clear that the court was
demanding anything more than a partial quantification of costs and benefits.
The two earlier cases relied on by the court in Business Roundtable similarly did not
require full quantification of costs and benefits. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC,
613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (striking down an SEC rule that narrowed a pre-existing
exception so as to subject certain annuity contracts to the securities laws for an agency’s
failure to correctly define the baseline status quo against which the “efficiency” of the new
rule would be assessed); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(striking down SEC rule requiring certain mutual funds to have boards made up of 75%
independent directors and an independent chair for agency’s failure to adequately quantify
costs of the rule, but rejecting industry’s claim that its assessment of the benefits was
inadequate: “[W]e are acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every
action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be
‘entitled to conduct . . . a general analysis based on informed conjecture.’” (quoting Melcher
v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
213
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting
industry claim that SEC performed an inadequate CBA in connection with its rule imposing
disclosure requirements on companies using minerals obtained in and around the Democratic
Republic of Congo where trade in such minerals helps to fuel armed conflict); Inv. Co. Inst.
v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 370, 370–78 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding
against a CBA challenge a rule issued by the CFTC narrowing an exception that had
previously allowed certain kinds of derivatives to escape regulation under the Commodity
Exchange Act).
214
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 369 (quoting Inv. Co. Inst., 720 F.3d at 379).
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about the academic debate, we might expect to see the agencies and the White House
moving toward informality as well. That does, after all, appear to be the path of least
resistance. Surprisingly, a close look at the executive orders and guidance
documents that govern agency use of CBA, as well as anecdotal evidence of agency
practice, suggests a marked pull in the opposite direction. The executive branch,
particularly the White House, appears to push toward more formality in CBA.
A. Executive Orders and Guidance
There is a strange disconnect in environmental law between what statutes tell
the agencies to do and what executive orders tell them to do. 215 As detailed above,
the vast majority of this country’s environmental statutes direct the agencies to set
regulatory standards using some criterion other than CBA, and some even outright
prohibit the use of CBA. 216 Yet, at the same time, in a kind of parallel universe, a
series of executive orders, dating back to President Reagan, direct executive branch
agencies to perform CBA on all “major” regulations—that is, those costing $100
million or more per year. Since an executive order obviously cannot trump a
statutory command, this can put the agencies in the anomalous position of having to
prepare a CBA that they cannot actually use in making their decision. 217 A similar
disconnect exists with respect to the formality of CBA, with statutes and court
decisions endorsing primarily informal CBA while the executive orders and
guidance documents prescribe a form of CBA that falls well toward the formal end
of the spectrum. 218
The CBA executive order that President Bill Clinton issued in 1993 is still in
effect and requires agencies to propose or adopt regulations “only upon a reasoned

215

See Masur & Posner, supra note 71, at 667 (noting that as a result of this disconnect
“[a]gencies thus find themselves whipsawed”).
216
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (determining that
EPA may not use CBA in setting Clean Air Act’s air quality standards); Am. Textile Mfrs.
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 512–13 (1981) (holding that Occupational Safety and
Health Act directs OSHA to set workplace health standards for toxics on the basis of a
feasibility test, which the Court viewed as inconsistent with CBA); Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (holding that Endangered Species Act imposes absolute duties
on federal agencies “to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost” that preclude CBA).
217
The requirement that agencies conduct CBAs of major rules also appears in the
UMRA. 2 U.S.C. §§ 658–658g, 1501–71 (2012). See supra note 148. The UMRA requires
agencies to prepare a CBA of major rules, id. § 1532(a), and to use the CBA to choose the
“least burdensome” alternative, id. § 1535(a), but provides an exception to that requirement
where it is “inconsistent with law,” id. § 1535(b)(2). Accordingly, like the executive orders,
the UMRA does not trump other statutes.
218
See Cannon, supra note 9, at 455 (“[A]rguably the strong form of CBA is codified
for significant rulemakings in federal administrative practice . . . .”).
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determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.” 219 While
it is not entirely clear where along Axis 2 this “justify” formulation falls, most
observers assume that it represents a slight shift toward informality in comparison
to President Reagan’s Executive Order, which required benefits to “outweigh”
costs. 220 President Clinton’s Order also makes a few nods toward informality along
Axis 1, making several references to the difficulties inherent in attempting to
quantify certain values and directing that costs and benefits “be understood to
include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully
estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify
but nevertheless essential to consider.” 221 On the other hand, President Clinton’s
Order also contains language very similar to President Reagan’s Order that seems to
tilt decidedly toward formality, requiring agencies to choose “among alternative
regulatory approaches” so as to “select those approaches that maximize net

219
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted as amended
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012). In 2007, President George W. Bush supplemented
Executive Order 12,866 with Executive Order 13,422, which, in addition to CBA of major
rules, required a finding that the rule aimed at curing some “specific market failure.” Exec.
Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008). It also expanded the power of OIRA over rulemaking
by applying the CBA mandate to guidance documents as well as rules and by requiring a
presidential appointee to serve as Regulatory Policy Officer within each agency. Id. President
Obama revoked this executive order, however, soon after taking office. Exec. Order No.
13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102.
220
Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982) (“Regulatory action shall
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the
potential costs to society.”). See, e.g., Graham, supra note 2, at 433 (describing the “justify”
formulation as the “‘soft’ benefit-cost test”). This view is strengthened by the fact that the
“justify” language in the Clinton Executive Order is preceded by another reference to the
difficulty of quantifying benefits: “Each agency shall . . .[,] recognizing that some costs and
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits . . . justify its costs.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(6), 3
C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994) (emphasis added).
The antiregulatory mission of the Reagan Executive Order was made clear in its
preamble, which stated that the purpose of the executive order was, inter alia, “to reduce the
burdens of existing and future regulations.” Id. pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 127. (That language was
omitted from the subsequent Clinton Order, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1994).) For an historical account of how CBA has been pushed by political conservatives
and industry over the years, see REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 2, at 21–30.
221
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39. President Reagan’s Order
contained similar language about nonquantifiable costs and benefits, but stopped short of
calling them “essential to consider.” See Exec. Order No. 12,291 §3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 129
(requiring the description of benefits, costs, and net benefits to each include “any . . . effects
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms”).
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benefits.” 222 This directive for net benefits maximization requires a CBA near the
formal end of the spectrum along all three axes. 223
Soon after President Obama came into office in 2009, he considered revoking
Executive Order 12,866, and, in fact, solicited public comment on that idea. 224
Ultimately, however, he left the prior order in place and instead simply issued
Executive Order 13,563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” which
“supplement[s] . . . and reaffirms” the Clinton Order. 225 This new order reiterates
some of the key language of Executive Order 12,866, including the requirement that
agencies show that a regulation’s “benefits justify its costs”; the requirement that
they “select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches
that maximize net benefits”; and the recognition “that some benefits and costs are
difficult to quantify.” 226 In language that arguably shifts even further toward
formality and has no analogue in the Clinton Order, however, it also unambiguously
sets out full quantification as the goal, stating that “each agency is directed to use
the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and
costs as accurately as possible.” 227 It follows this statement with an acknowledgment
of the difficulties that arise in attempting to quantify some values, but makes the
directive that agencies discuss unquantifiable values permissive rather than
mandatory: “Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider
(and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify,
including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.” 228
The executive orders’ CBA directive was further refined and clarified in OMB
Circular A-4, which was issued by OIRA in 2003. 229 This document is also clear in
setting up Economic CBA as the goal, stating that CBA “provide[s] a systematic
framework for identifying and evaluating the likely outcomes of alternative

222

Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39. A subsequent section of the
executive order also requires the agency to submit to OIRA “[a]n assessment, including the
underlying analysis, of costs and benefits of potentially effective and reasonably feasible
alternatives to the planned regulation.” Id. § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. at 646. President
Reagan’s Order similarly stated, “Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net
benefits to society” and “[a]mong alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective,
the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen.” Exec. Order No. 12,291
§2(c)–(d), 3 C.F.R. at 128.
223
See supra Part II.C.3.
224
See Memorandum: Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009) (directing
OMB to produce recommendations for a new executive order on regulatory review); Federal
Regulatory Review, Request for Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009) (OMB
requesting public comment on those recommendations).
225
Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 app. at 102–03 (2012).
226
Id.
227
Id. § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. at 216.
228
Id. (emphasis added).
229
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 1 (2003).
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regulatory choices,” 230 and that “[w]here all benefits and costs can be quantified and
expressed in monetary units, benefit-cost analysis [BCA] provides decision makers
with a clear indication of the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative that
generates the largest net benefits to society (ignoring distributional effects).” 231
Later it reiterates the same point, saying, “By measuring incremental benefits and
costs of successively more stringent regulatory alternatives, you can identify the
alternative that maximizes net benefits.” 232 The Circular is clearly grounded in
economic theory and uses the language of that discipline, directing agencies to
measure costs and benefits in terms of “opportunity costs” and “willingness-topay.” 233
While acknowledging that “[i]t will not always be possible to express in
monetary units all of the important benefits and costs,” 234 the OMB Circular clearly
contemplates complete monetization as the goal and the norm: “A distinctive feature
of BCA is that both benefits and costs are expressed in monetary units, which allows
you to evaluate different regulatory options with a variety of attributes using a
common measure.” 235
The EPA’s Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses are similarly geared
toward a highly formal CBA. 236 The introduction frames the CBA endeavor from
the outset in the language of economic theory: “[The Potential Pareto] criterion is
the foundation of BCA, requiring that a policy’s net benefits to society be positive.
. . . The policy that maximizes net benefits is considered the most efficient.” 237 And
the guidelines contain a detailed appendix that provides a textbook introduction to

230

Id. at 9.
Id. at 2.
232
Id. at 10. Later, the Circular reiterates the importance of measuring the costs and
benefits of a whole range of incrementally varying alternatives (formality on Axis 3),
directing agencies to “present both total and incremental benefits and costs” of successive
alternatives. Id. at 16.
233
Id. at 18. The Circular also makes repeated reference to the importance of ensuring
that the methods used by agencies in preparing CBAs are “consistent with economic theory.”
Id. at 21, 23.
234
Id. at 2.
235
Id. at 10. (“BCA” or “benefit-cost analysis” is a synonym for CBA. See supra note
3.) Similarly, by requiring all costs and benefits to be discounted at both 3 and 7 percent, the
OMB Circular clearly assumes full monetization, or at least quantification. See id. at 31–37;
see also id. at 36 (assuming that non-monetized benefits are at least quantified: “[E]ven for
benefits and costs that are not expressed in monetary units . . . [t]he timing differences can
be handled through discounting.”).
236
GUIDELINES, supra note 12.
237
Id. at 1-4. Starting in 1983, the EPA issued a series of guidelines for preparing CBAs.
The Agency released its most recent version in December 2010 (with some discrete updates
relating to environmental justice added in May 2014). See id. at 1-1. This document was
prepared by economists at the EPA and subsequently peer reviewed by the EPA’s Science
Advisory Board.
231
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the fundamentals of economic theory. 238 Thus, like the OMB Circular, the EPA’s
guidelines require that “[b]enefits and costs should be reported in monetary terms
whenever possible” and that “[b]enefits and costs that cannot be monetized should,
if possible, be quantified,” while also acknowledging that “[i]n reality . . . there are
often effects that cannot be monetized, and the analysis needs to communicate the
full richness of benefit and cost information beyond what can be put in dollar
terms.” 239 Nonetheless, despite these caveats, the guidelines require a strict
numerical comparison of costs against benefits in order “to determine a regulation’s
net benefits, even if important benefits or costs cannot be monetized.” 240 This
language pulls strongly in the direction of formality, and arguably encourages false
formality, by directing the Agency to combine inconsistent positions on Axes 1 and
2. 241
Thus, the language in the executive orders providing that benefits need only
“justify” costs and acknowledging that some costs and benefits will be
unquantifiable gives a nod to informality on Axes 2 and 1 (respectively) and suggests
that informality may, at times, be tolerated. But, at the same time, the repeated
references in the executive orders and the guidance documents to maximizing net
benefits and quantifying costs and benefits “as accurately as possible” clearly set up
Economic CBA as the goal. 242
B. Agency Practice
Anecdotal evidence also indicates a tilt toward formality in agency practice, at
least at the EPA. 243 Two examples can be found in the EPA rulemakings on cooling
water intake structures—first, in the rulemaking the Court ultimately reviewed in
Riverkeeper, and, second, in the rulemaking that followed the Supreme Court’s
remand in that case. The basic outlines of these two examples are described below.
More detail can be found in my article, Cost Benefit Analysis, Ben Franklin, and the
Supreme Court. 244

238

Id. app. A.
Id. at 11-2.
240
Id. at 11-3 (emphasis added).
241
See supra Figure 7.
242
See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03 (2012).
243
Christopher Carrigan & Stuart Shapiro, What’s Wrong with the Back of the
Envelope? A Call for Simple (and Timely) Benefit-Cost Analysis 5 (Geo. Wash. U. Reg.
Studies Ctr., Working Paper Oct. 2014), available at http://regulatorystudies.columbian.
gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Carrigan_ShapiroBack-of-the-Envelope.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XNM5-9R2Z (arguing that
“[Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs)] appear to be becoming more complex” based on an
analysis of data showing that RIAs prepared between 2009 and 2012 were over four times
longer on average than RIAs prepared in 2000).
244
See generally Sinden, supra note 105.
239
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1. EPA’s CBA on Cooling Water Intakes: Round I
Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the EPA to regulate cooling water
intake structures at power plants and other large industrial facilities. 245 These
structures withdraw billions of gallons of water a day from rivers, lakes, and
estuaries, and, in so doing, kill billions of fish and aquatic organisms, squashing
them against intake screens and sucking them up into the internal workings of the
plant. The EPA issued Phase I of these regulations, governing new facilities, in 2001.
In so doing, the EPA interpreted the statutory language requiring “the best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” as a
straightforward feasibility standard, 246 comparing facilities’ projected compliance
costs for various technologies to their projected revenues. 247 On this basis, the EPA
concluded that closed cycle cooling—a method that minimizes the amount of water
used by recirculating it—was the “best technology available” (BTA) with costs of
less than 1% of revenues for all but nine of the affected facilities. 248 When it came
time to submit a CBA to OIRA under Executive Order 12,866, 249 the EPA left it
informal, making no effort to quantify or monetize the environmental benefits of the
rule, or to compare them to costs. 250
Phase II governed existing plants. Because retrofitting an existing plant to
incorporate closed cycle cooling costs more than incorporating it into a new plant’s
design, in the draft proposed rule it sent to OIRA, the EPA proposed to only require
closed cycle cooling for the fifty-nine largest and most damaging plants. 251 The
others would be allowed to use the older “once-through” technology and make

245

33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
Id.; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,060, 49,065 (proposed
Aug. 10, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–25) [hereinafter Proposed Phase I New
Facilities Rule].
247
Proposed Phase I New Facilities Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. at 49,095.
248
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256, 65,324 (Dec. 18,
2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122–25) [hereinafter Final Phase I New Facilities Rule].
249
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §
601 app. at 88–92 (2012).
250
Final Phase I New Facilities Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,312 (“[I]t is neither required
nor prudent for EPA to develop empirical estimates of benefits where data limitations or
other critical constraints preclude doing so in a credible and reliable manner.”). OIRA
sometimes pushes back in such situations, sending rules back to the EPA with demands for
more quantification. But this time it accepted the CBA as is. See id. at 65,327 (stating that
the final rule was reviewed by OIRA); id. at 65,312 (stating that the CBA associated with
the final rule did not quantify the rule’s benefits).
251
EPA, OMB Review Draft for the Proposed Section 316(b) Rule for Large Cooling
Water Intake Structures at Existing Power Generating Facilities, Docket W-00-32, DCN #
4-4005, at 72 (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter OMB Review Draft—Proposed Phase II Rule].
246
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relatively modest changes to their intake structures—new types of screens and filters
that are less effective at saving fish, but also less expensive. 252 As it had done for the
new plants, the EPA assessed the “economic practicability” of this proposal by
comparing compliance costs to annual revenues. 253 Its conclusion was that
compliance costs would be “low.” Indeed, 82% of firms would incur compliance
costs of less than 0.5% of revenues, and 91% would incur costs of less than 1%. 254
This time, however, the EPA took a very different approach to the CBA. Rather
than declining to attempt any quantification of benefits, as it had done with the Phase
I rule, the Agency spent enormous amounts of time and resources attempting to
devise a fully quantified and monetized CBA. 255 The problem was that the data
available on the ecological and other benefits of reducing harms to fish and other
aquatic organisms were vastly incomplete, and the methods for converting such data
into monetary equivalents were highly controversial.
Accordingly, the EPA left out whole categories of aquatic organisms for which
it simply had no data. 256 And of those it did include, the Agency counted less than
2% of the individuals in each species. 257 This represented the fraction of the total
population that could actually be expected to be caught by commercial or
recreational fisherman once they escaped the cooling water intake structures. 258 The

252

Id. at 75.
Compare National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations
To Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing
Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,158 (proposed Apr. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Phase
II Existing Facilities Rule], with supra notes 246–248 and accompanying text.
254
Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,158 ex.5.
255
The EPA recognized that the task would be “challenging,” National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling
Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,613 (July 9,
2004) [hereinafter Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule], and expressed concern from the
outset that formal CBAs under the CWA have generally “been limited in the range of benefits
addressed,” thus “hinder[ing] EPA’s ability to compare . . . benefits and costs . . .
comprehensively,” Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,191.
256
These included phytoplankton, zooplankton, endangered sea turtles, shrimp, crabs,
and lobsters, among others. See Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at
41,586; OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, REGIONAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT FOR THE FINAL SECTION
316(B) PHASE II EXISTING FACILITIES RULE, EPA-821-R-02-003, at A9-1 (2004) [hereinafter
REGIONAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT—FINAL PHASE II RULE], available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/upload/Cooling-Water_Phase-2_
Regional-benefits_2004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZYS-RHH8; OFFICE OF WATER,
EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) PHASE II
EXISTING FACILITIES RULE, EPA-821-R-02-001, at C1-7 (2002) [hereinafter ECONOMIC AND
BENEFITS ANALYSIS—FINAL PHASE II RULE], available at http://water.epa.gov/laws
regs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/upload/Cooling-Water_Phase-2_Economics_2004.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/XYL5-9WKJ.
257
Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,660–61.
258
Id.
253
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EPA candidly admitted that it had vastly undercounted the fish that would be
protected by the rule, stating that its estimate “does not account for the benefits from
the remaining 98.2% of the . . . aquatic organisms estimated to be protected
nationally under today’s rule.” 259 Nonetheless, the Agency continued to doggedly
pursue a formal CBA.
Next, the Agency had to tackle the difficult task of assigning monetary values
to the fish. With respect to the fish that would be commercially caught, the EPA
simply used the market price. 260 But assigning a monetary value to recreational
fishing and ecological benefits posed more of a challenge. 261 Several monetization
methods the EPA used initially proved controversial. 262 Ultimately, after receiving
considerable criticism in the comments to the proposed rule, the EPA threw up its
hands and attached no dollar value at all to the vast majority of the ecological values,
effectively zeroing them out. 263
In the end, the EPA flatly acknowledged that the exercise had been a failure.
Its benefits estimate was grossly incomplete, making a meaningful comparison with
costs impossible: “EPA notes that these analyses are based on a comparison of a
partial measure of benefits with a complete measure of costs; therefore, the results
must be interpreted with caution.” 264
Nonetheless, it appears that the EPA (presumably under pressure from OIRA)
used this flawed CBA as the basis for significantly weakening the rule. When the
rule emerged from OIRA review, the closed cycle cooling requirement for the fiftynine most damaging plants had been removed, making those plants subject to the

259

Id. at 41,661.
Id. at 41,659–60.
261
For recreational fishing, the EPA used the travel cost method, which generated
considerable controversy. Id. at 41,657–58; REGIONAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT—FINAL
PHASE II RULE, supra note 256, at A11-1 to A11-13.
262
See Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,191–93
(proposed April 9, 2002) (using “trophic transfer method” and the Habitat Replacement Cost
method).
263
In the final rule, the EPA abandoned altogether the Habitat Replacement Cost
analysis—criticized by Harvard economist Robert Stavins as “empirically invalid” and
“fundamentally flawed,” Comments of Robert N. Stavins on EPA’s Notice of Data
Availability for the Proposed 316(b) Phase II Rule ( June 2, 2003) (submitted to EPA, Docket
ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049-0363)—using instead the far lower (and less complete)
numbers generated by the trophic transfer model. Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69
Fed. Reg. at 41,657.
264
Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,666; see also ECONOMIC
AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS—FINAL PHASE II RULE, supra note 256, at D1-5 (“A comparison
of complete costs and incomplete benefits does not provide an accurate picture of net benefits
to society.”); OMB Review Draft—Proposed Phase II Rule, supra note 251, at 211 (“EPA
cannot perform a complete benefit-cost comparison because not all of the benefits resulting
from the proposed regulatory alternative can be valued in dollar terms.”).
260
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same weak standards that applied to everyone else. 265 And the only reason the EPA
cited for the change was the numeric result of its CBA: the dollar costs of the rule—
$413 million—outweighed the dollar benefits of the rule—$146 million. 266 Despite
the Agency’s earlier repeated protestations that the benefits estimate was incomplete
and the directive of its own guidance document to “communicate the full richness”
of unquantifiable values, 267 the EPA made no mention of the numerous
nonquantified and underquantified benefits. 268 We can only assume that OIRA
ignored the EPA’s admonition to interpret the results of its CBA “with caution” and
pressured the EPA to do the same. 269
The result was a perfect poster child for what I’m calling false formality. This
is a corruption of CBA that occurs when the analyst inappropriately combines
inconsistent positions on two or more of the formality-informality Axes. Here, EPA
did exactly that. The monetized benefits estimate was, by the Agency’s own
admission, vastly incomplete, thus placing the analysis well toward the informal end
of the spectrum on Axis 1. But even so, the Agency applied a balancing test on the
formal end of Axis 2 that precisely compared the bare numbers, and left out the
many unquantifiable benefits. The result was a logically incoherent analysis that
inappropriately combined two inconsistent positions on Axes 1 and 2, 270 purporting
to balance with precision a grossly incomplete estimate of benefits against a
relatively complete estimate of costs. 271 As Professor Doug Kysar put it, “Unable to

265

See Harrington, supra note 130, at 162; EPA, Summary of Major Changes During
Interagency Review, Docket W-00-3, DCN # 4-4019, at 1 (Feb. 28, 2002). Another change
was the addition of the site-specific compliance alternative, allowing facilities to escape the
national performance standards based on a site specific CBA. Id.
266
Proposed Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,158; Sinden, supra
note 105, at 1199–1200. The EPA used the term “significantly outweigh,” but given how
vastly incomplete the benefits estimate was, this was clearly a nonsensical conclusion. One
need only imagine that the monetized portion of the benefits represented a third or less of the
benefits’ full value to see that the balance could easily have tipped the other way—benefits
outweighing costs. Indeed, natural resources economist Frank Ackerman, Ph.D., in
comments submitted on the proposed rule, suggested that even just correcting for a few of
the many inaccuracies in the EPA’s benefits estimate would yield an estimate four to six
times as high. Comments from Frank Ackerman, Professor, Tufts Univ., on EPA’s Section
316(b) Stated Preference Survey (July 10, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law Review). This
would yield benefits significantly higher than costs, in the range of $584 to $876 million.
267
GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 11-2; see Sinden, supra note 105, at 1200.
268
See supra notes 256–263 and accompanying text.
269
Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,666.
270
See supra fig. 7.
271
This kind of false formality is arguably encouraged by the directive in the EPA’s
guidelines to calculate a number for net benefits “even if important benefits or costs cannot
be monetized.” GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 11-3 (emphasis added). To be fair, however,
those guidelines also require the agency “to communicate the full richness of benefit and
cost information beyond what can be put in dollar terms,” id. at 11-2, something the EPA
failed to do in this instance.
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measure what was important, EPA instead chose to make important what it could
measure.” 272 The result was patently irrational—180 degrees from Ben Franklin’s
reasonableness and common sense.
Two relevant points emerge from this example. First, the Agency went out of
its way to do formal CBA when it didn’t have to (and when doing so arguably made
no sense). Second, the formal CBA the Agency did perform provides a perfect
example of what I’m calling false formality. Another example of an agency moving
toward the formal end of the CBA spectrum occurred in connection with the EPA’s
second round of rulemaking on cooling water intake structures, which the next
section describes.
2. EPA’s CBA of Cooling Water Intakes: Round II
Perhaps even more surprising than the EPA’s move toward formality in the
rulemaking leading up to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Riverkeeper is the
Agency’s dramatic move even further along the formality spectrum in the
rulemaking that followed. 273 Despite the Supreme Court’s expressions of skepticism
about more formal or “rigorous” varieties of CBA, in drafting the new cooling water
rule on remand, the EPA moved further toward formality in two ways. First, in order
to conduct a nationwide CBA of the rule as a whole, the EPA expended substantial
time and energy conducting a stated-preference survey in what ultimately proved to
be a “futile” attempt to quantify and monetize the ecological and existence-value
benefits that it had been unable to quantify the first time around. 274 Second, in
crafting the rules for case-by-case CBA, the EPA—at the behest of OIRA—replaced
the relatively informal balancing formulas (“wholly disproportionate” and then
“significantly greater than”), which it had used previously and which had been
specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court, with the more formal requirement that
the benefits must “justify” the costs. 275
The story begins in July 2010, a year after the remand, when the EPA
announced that it would conduct a stated-preference survey in connection with its

272
Douglas A. Kysar, Fish Tales, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
supra note 53, at 199.
273
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Riverkeeper, the rule was remanded to
the EPA because the Second Circuit had also invalidated the rule on other grounds not raised
in the Supreme Court. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009)
(“We of course express no view on the remaining bases for the Second Circuit’s remand
which did not depend on the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis.”).
274
See id. at 235 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275
Interestingly, in developing the new facilities portion of the Phase III rule, a process
that started years before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Riverkeeper came down, the EPA
declined to use CBA, citing its inability to reliably quantify the benefits, a decision that the
Fifth Circuit upheld a year after Riverkeeper in ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822,
826–27 (5th Cir. 2010).
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new version of the cooling water rule. 276 The announcement immediately unleashed
a firestorm of criticism from both industry and environmentalists. Industry
advocates maintained that the method was inherently unreliable and would vastly
overstate the benefits of the rule. 277 They pointed to the well-known problem of
“hypothetical bias”—the fact that when asked in a survey what they would
hypothetically pay for some good, people tend to overestimate what they would be
willing to pay if they were actually required to take money out of their wallets. 278
Environmental groups, meanwhile, warned that the stated-preference survey would
understate the rule’s benefits because it framed the question in terms of people’s
willingness to pay to obtain environmental values rather than their willingness to
accept payment to give up environmental values—here fish and aquatic ecosystems
that, “[l]ike the air and water themselves . . . are public trust resources belonging to
the public at large.” 279
Preliminary results published in June 2012 suggested dramatic results. 280 The
EPA provided figures on households’ willingness to pay for a one percentage point
improvement in fish mortality levels 281 but didn’t tally up its numbers to provide
final dollar values for total national willingness to pay for each proposed option.
Professor Frank Ackerman, an economist hired by a set of environmental groups
commenting on the rule, did the missing arithmetic and concluded that the survey

276

Willingness To Pay Survey for Section 316(b) Existing Facilities Cooling Water
Intake Structures (New), 75 Fed. Reg. 42,438 (July 21, 2010).
277
Am. Chem. Council et al., Comments on ICR for Willingness to Pay Survey for
Section 316(B) Existing Facilities Cooling Water Intake Structures, at 17 (2010) (submitted
to EPA, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2010-0595) [hereinafter ACC Comments (2010)].
Indeed, the controversy reached the House of Representatives, where Republican members
questioned the EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy about the Agency’s use of these surveys
at a congressional hearing. See Lee Logan, McCarthy Sidesteps GOP Concern about NonUse Benefits in Future Rules, INSIDE EPA, Dec. 6, 2013, at 34.
278
See ACC Comments (2010), supra note 277, at 27. The EPA responded to this
concern by simply asking survey respondents if they were biased and taking their answers at
face value. See EPA, SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST
FOR WILLINGNESS TO PAY SURVEY FOR § 316(B) EXISTING FACILITIES COOLING WATER
INTAKE STRUCTURES: INSTRUMENT, PRE-TEST, AND IMPLEMENTATION 9 (2014), available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/upload/316bsupport.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/4MX8-9VR2.
279
See Comments from Reed W. Super, Founder, Super Law Grp., LLC, to EPA, on
Proposed ICR for Stated Preference Survey for Section 316(b) Rulemaking 6 (Sept. 20,
2010) (submitted to EPA, Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OW–2010–0595). This was a reference
to the endowment effect, discussed above. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
280
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations To
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities; Notice of
Data Availability Related to EPA’s Stated Preference Survey, 77 Fed. Reg. 34,927, 34,929
(June 12, 2012).
281
EPA, SURVEY SUPPORT DOCUMENT: IN SUPPORT OF SECTION 316(b) STATED
PREFERENCE SURVEY NOTICE OF DATA AVAILABILITY 32–36 (2012).
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would result in huge numbers for the benefits of the rule as a whole, ranging from
$1.3 to $7 billion per year. These numbers produced total benefits for all four options
that would either substantially exceed costs or—using a high 7% discount rate—be
below costs by such a slight amount as to be within the margin of error. 282 Industry
economists appeared to agree with this assessment and, hence, industry commenters
urged the EPA to “abandon” its stated-preference survey altogether, 283 calling it “illconceived from the outset” 284 and “deeply flawed,” 285 and complaining that the
“benefit-cost calculations resulting from the survey are so far out of line with EPA’s
prior economic estimates as to be totally implausible.” 286 Environmentalists, on the
other hand, identified errors in the EPA’s analysis that they argued skewed the
results significantly downward. If those errors were corrected, they argued, the
benefits of the EPA’s most stringent closed cycle cooling option would have
outweighed the costs by three to one. 287
The EPA finally issued its final rule on May 19, 2014, 288 adopting a somewhat
watered-down version of the rule it had proposed three years earlier. 289 But after
intensive lobbying by industry, the long-anticipated results of the stated-preference
survey had been axed from the CBA. The preamble gave little in the way of
explanation for this omission, stating simply, “EPA decided not to employ the
survey results for purposes of decision-making, and EPA has not accounted for
values estimated from the survey in the quantitative comparison of costs and
benefits.” 290

282

Comments from Frank Ackerman, supra note 266, at 11.
Util. Water Act Grp. & Edison Elec. Inst., Comments on the Notice of Data
Availability Related to EPA’s Stated Preference Survey 6 (2012) (submitted to EPA, Docket
ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2008-0667).
284
Id. at 2.
285
Id. at 3.
286
Id. at 4.
287
Riverkeeper, Inc. et al., Comments on National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System—Proposed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake
Structures at Existing Facilities 5 (2012) (submitted to EPA, Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OW–
2008–0667).
288
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg.
48,300, 48,321–22 (Aug. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125) [hereinafter
Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand].
289
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Cooling Water Intake Structures
at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174, 22,204–05 (proposed Apr.
20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125) [hereinafter Proposed Existing Facilities
Rule Post-Remand].
290
Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,350; see also id. at
48,324–25. At one point, buried deep in the preamble, the EPA suggested obliquely that the
stated preference survey might have played a role in informing their qualitative estimate of
the magnitude of the benefits: “While preliminary, and not yet reviewed by EPA’s Science
Advisory Board, the preliminary results of EPA’s stated preference survey . . . suggest that
283
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Thus, the EPA ended up, as it had in the original rule a decade earlier, with a
monetized estimate of benefits ($33 million annually) that was vastly incomplete
and far below the annual cost estimate of $275 million. 291 Once again, the EPA was
upfront about the inadequacy of its monetary benefits estimate, noting that “[m]any
of the benefits that will result from the rule are not monetized or quantified, and as
a result the Agency’s monetized benefits analysis underestimates the totality of the
rule’s benefits.” 292 But this time, to its credit, the Agency did not, explicitly at least,
use the fact that the monetized benefits fell short of the costs as a justification for
weakening the rule. In balancing the costs and benefits, the EPA gave significant
weight to the unquantified benefits, concluding that the “benefits . . . justify the costs
of the rule,” even though the monetized benefits fell far short. 293
Thus, while the EPA appears to have avoided engaging in the kind of false
formality that characterized its first version of the rule, what is notable here is the
kind of CBA the Agency pursued in response to the Supreme Court’s decision. The
Agency’s first step after remand was to devote countless hours and resources to
conducting a stated-preference survey. This represented a dramatic shift in the
direction of formality, even in the face of a Supreme Court decision clearly
encouraging the EPA to move in the opposite direction and suggesting that a move
toward formality might be out of bounds. And, one might say the EPA’s eventual
abandonment of the survey in connection with the final rule makes Justice Breyer’s
warning that “attempts at comprehensive monetization” will ultimately prove
“futile” seem prescient. 294
The EPA also moved toward formality with respect to the other way CBA
figures in this rulemaking—site-specific CBAs. The Obama EPA’s new rule is far
more lenient than the original, Bush-era rule that was approved by the Supreme
Court. The old rule included a variance procedure under which individual plants

[the unquantified benefits] have the potential to be significantly different from zero.” Id. at
48,415 (citations omitted). But the Agency subsequently hurried to reassure its audience that
“EPA did not rely on the results of its stated preference survey in estimating the benefits of
today’s rule.” Id. at 48,401.
291
Id. at 48,350.
292
Id. at 48,349.
293
Id. While this was exactly the kind of situation in which OIRA advises use of a
break-even analysis, the EPA did not use that term.
294
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 235 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). While the EPA gave little explanation in the preamble for its
decision to abandon the stated-preference survey, at certain points it seemed to suggest that
the stated-preference survey might be an ongoing effort that could conceivably benefit future
rulemakings. See Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,406 (“EPA
presents preliminary benefits estimates based on the stated preference survey in the [Benefits
Assessment] to demonstrate progress on this effort.”). But the EPA’s experience so far with
the stated-preference survey simply illustrates the degree to which efforts to use highly
controversial, contestable, and manipulable methods to monetize nonmarket goods
ultimately shift agency decision making into a highly politicized realm. See Sinden, Defense
of Absolutes, supra note 2, at 1452–59.

2015]

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

161

could in specific circumstances escape from the national standards by conducting a
site-specific CBA showing that their compliance costs would be “significantly
greater than” the benefits. 295 But the new rule subjects all facilities to a case-by-case
BTA determination by state permit writers, based in part on a site-specific CBA. 296
This time the EPA initially used a “wholly disproportionate” standard for these
site-specific CBAs rather than the “significantly greater than” formulation from the
Bush-era rule. This may have been in response to Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Riverkeeper, in which he questioned the EPA’s use of the “significantly greater
than” formulation. In the first few decades after passage of the Clean Water Act,
before it got around to issuing national standards for cooling water intakes, the EPA
had directed state agencies to do all BTA determinations on a site-specific basis (a
system not unlike that created by the new rule). 297 Under that program, however, the
EPA had used a “wholly disproportionate” test. Justice Breyer, accordingly,
objected to the Agency’s failure to explain its departure from that balancing test in
the Bush-era rule. 298 It may be, then, that in drafting the proposed version of the new
Obama rule, the EPA initially used the original “wholly disproportionate” test in the
hopes of avoiding having to provide Justice Breyer with an explanation should the
rule return to the Supreme Court.
Thus, in the draft proposed rule it submitted to OIRA for review, the EPA
prohibited state permit writers from rejecting an otherwise available technology
“unless the social costs of compliance are wholly disproportionate to the social
benefits.” 299 In explaining the use of this informal Axis 2 standard, the EPA stressed
that the challenges posed by site-specific CBA would necessitate a relatively
informal position along Axis 1, noting that “when dealing with only a single site
assessment the quantified and monetized estimates of benefits are more uncertain
and less comprehensive than the estimates of costs” and that “[i]mportant benefit
effect categories will very likely not be able to be quantified and monetized.” 300
OIRA, however, pushed the EPA back toward the formal end of the spectrum—
and not just to the “significantly greater” formulation upheld by the Supreme Court
in the original rule. When the rule emerged from review, OIRA had deleted the
EPA’s reference to the difficulties of quantification and monetization and replaced
the “wholly disproportionate” balancing formula with language allowing standards
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Final Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,686 (July 9, 2004).
Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,300.
297
See OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT PERMITS DIV., EPA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
EVALUATING THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES ON THE
AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT: SECTION 316(b) P.L. 92–500 (1977).
298
Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 235–36 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
299
EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and
Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities 293, 381 (2011) (draft of proposed rule) (on file
with the Utah Law Review).
300
Id. at 292.
296
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to be loosened whenever costs are not “justified by” benefits. 301 While it is not
entirely clear where exactly on Axis 2 this “justify” formulation falls, it seems safe
to say that it falls well to the right of the “wholly disproportionate” test. 302 Moreover,
since this formulation tracks the language of the Clinton Executive Order, it can be
read to embody the same leaning toward formality contained in that document.303
Thus, in this instance, OIRA pushed the EPA to adopt a brand of CBA that is
significantly more formal than what the Agency had first proposed or what the
Supreme Court had endorsed in Riverkeeper.
In sum, there appears to be a discernable pull in the executive branch toward
more formal modes of CBA. The executive orders requiring CBA of major agency
rules and the guidance documents interpreting those orders all hold up formal
Economic CBA as the goal. Additionally, in the two rulemakings preceding and
following the Riverkeeper case, we see anecdotal evidence of the EPA leaning hard
toward formality, even in the face of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion expressing
substantial doubts about such an approach.
C. Why the Move Toward Formality? Some Speculations
Why does the executive branch seem to push for more formality in CBA despite
the fact that more formal versions of CBA clearly spark more controversy in the
academic community and also appear to be viewed with considerable skepticism by
both Congress and the federal courts? While I have no definitive answer to this
question, I offer some speculations below.
One obvious answer is to simply take the executive orders at their word: the
executive branch values CBA’s standard setting function and wishes to use it to
locate economically efficient levels of regulation. Putting aside the many arguments
from the academic debate about why the notion of efficiency might itself be illusory

301

See EPA, Redlined National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed
Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing
Facilities and Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities 308–09 (2011) [hereinafter EPA
Redlined Proposed CWIS Rule] (redlined draft of proposed rule) (on file with the Utah Law
Review) (deleting references to the difficulties and uncertainties associated with
quantification and monetization quoted above and replacing the “wholly disproportionate”
test with the “justify” test); see also Proposed Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 76 Fed.
Reg. 22,174, 22,288 (proposed Apr. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125).
This language also appears in the final rule. Final Existing Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 79
Fed. Reg. 48,300, 48,352 (Aug. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125). In a
nod toward informality, the rule does specify (not unlike the executive order) that the sitespecific CBA should include consideration of “qualitative social benefits and costs.” Id. §
125.98(f)(2)(v).
302
See supra notes 50–52, 219–220, and accompanying text.
303
Indeed, the proposed rule (as re-written by OIRA) indicated that the justify
formulation was based on the executive orders and intended to have the same meaning. See
EPA Redlined Proposed CWIS Rule, supra note 301, at 151.
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or perhaps impossible to achieve in practice, another reason to at least perhaps
hesitate in embracing this explanation emerges from the discussion above. Locating
the economically efficient level of regulation requires formal Economic CBA, which
requires measuring costs and benefits for a large number of alternatives. But CBA
as actually practiced by agencies often evaluates only a single alternative and rarely
evaluates more than a handful, putting those CBAs well toward the left end of Axis
3, far from formal Economic CBA. 304 Indeed, the most such a litmus-test CBA can
hope to achieve, assuming reasonably complete monetization, is an indication of
whether a regulation moves in the general direction of efficiency. But even a
regulation that passes that test may still be very far from the actual point of net
benefits maximization. The kind of litmus-test CBA performed by most agencies is
therefore a rather blunt instrument for achieving efficient regulation. 305
Alternatively, it may be that a concern with transparency is driving the move
toward formality. Transparency is, after all, one of the stated goals accompanying
the CBA requirement in Executive Order 12,866—“to make the process more
accessible and open to the public.” 306 And President Obama has devoted
considerable rhetorical energy to his administration’s commitment to increased
transparency.
Some CBA proponents argue that formality increases transparency. 307 Dan
Cole, for example, argues that formal CBA forces the analyst to make methods and
assumptions explicit, allowing “analysts, the media and interest groups [to] review[],
challeng[e], replicat[e], or even simply understand[] why a particular decision was
taken, rather than some other decision.” 308 On this view, the more formal a CBA
is—the more it makes use of data and numbers and mathematical formulas rather
than gut feeling and instinct—the more its results have the capacity to be replicated
and therefore checked by others, which creates transparency.
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See Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of
Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 869–
70, 874 (2000) (finding that, in an empirical study of forty-eight federal agency CBAs, “the
agencies generally did not provide a significant analysis of alternatives”); ECONOMIC
ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997)
(empirical evidence suggests that CBAs often fail to address a sufficient number of
alternatives).
305
See Alan J. Krupnick, The CAMR: An Economist’s Perspective, in REFORMING
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 143 (noting that in practice, CBAs are
not “sophisticated or comprehensive enough” to identify economically efficient policies).
306
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 88–92 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03 (2012).
307
See Sunstein, supra note 63 (stating “[q]uantification helps to promote
accountability, transparency, and consistency . . . .”); see SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE,
supra note 2, at 9, 27.
308
Cole, supra note 35, at 69–70.
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But this is just one of the laundry list of arguments in favor of (formal) CBA
that sparks heated debate in the academic community. Without delving too far into
that debate, I will simply note here the argument frequently made by CBA skeptics
that formal CBA actually inhibits rather than increases transparency. Skeptics
(including myself in other work) contend that formal CBA obscures the value
judgments that actually drive CBA behind a veil of seemingly objective and
scientific numbers, that the numbers tend to eclipse important qualitative
considerations, and that the technical methods of CBA—which employ
sophisticated mathematics and abstruse concepts like discounting—are inaccessible
to members of the general public and thus further tilt the playing field in favor of
moneyed industrial interests who can afford to hire consultants over cash-strapped
environmental groups who cannot. 309 But this, of course, brings us back to the
question of why the executive branch would purposely move toward controversy
rather than away from it.
It may well be that the reason for the executive branch’s apparent tilt toward
formality lies primarily in the institutional dynamics relating to the interplay
between the EPA and OIRA, the details of which are largely beyond the scope of
this Article. I will nonetheless make a few brief observations in that direction based
on the recent writings of Professors Cass Sunstein and Lisa Heinzerling. During
President Obama’s first term, Professor Sunstein was OIRA Director and Professor
Heinzerling was Associate Administrator of the EPA’s Office of Policy, where she
interfaced regularly with Professor Sunstein’s OIRA. Professors Sunstein’s and
Hienzerling’s descriptions of their time in the executive branch both confirm that
the embrace of formality apparent in the executive orders and guidance documents
is also reflected in OIRA practice and that OIRA regularly exerts pressure on
agencies to increase the formality of their CBAs.
Indeed, by Professor Sunstein’s account, it appears that practices at OIRA have
moved even more in the direction of formality than those documents themselves
necessarily require. For example, Professor Sunstein characterizes the language of
Executive Order 13,563 as “reflect[ing] an unprecedented emphasis on the
importance of quantification” in the Obama administration. 310 In another article, he
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Coates IV, supra note 9, at 71–79 (arguing formal CBA can be used as “camouflage”
that can “as or more easily mislead as inform the public,” and CBA requirements may create
incentives for agencies to make the analysis obscure and difficult to understand); Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2064–65, 2068
(1998); Sinden, supra note 149, at 219–22.
310
Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions
(and Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 171 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Real World]; see also Sunstein, supra note 307, at 7 (stating that Executive Order 13,563’s
requirement that agencies “‘quantify anticipated benefits and costs as accurately as possible’
. . . attests to the importance of both quantification and monetization” (quoting Exec. Order
No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102–03
(2012)); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1864 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, Myths & Realities]
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boasts about the hard line that his OIRA took on CBA: “If the quantifiable benefits
are lower than the quantifiable costs, agencies must explain why they seek to
proceed . . . . In the Obama Administration, it has been very rare for a rule to have
monetized costs in excess of monetized benefits.” 311 And in his book he makes clear
that, as OIRA director, he did not adopt the informal, kinder and gentler form of
CBA he had endorsed in his earlier writings:
In fact, we should make a distinction here. On one view, analysis of
costs and benefits really is just a nudge. Agencies have to produce such an
analysis, but they do not need to be constrained by it. If the costs outweigh
the benefits, they remain entitled to go forward. On another view, the
analysis of costs and benefits is not merely a nudge; it is a rule of decision.
On this view, agencies cannot proceed unless the benefits justify the costs.
In the Obama Administration we took the stronger view: Agencies could
not go forward if the benefits did not justify the costs, unless the law
required them to do so. 312
And in another recent article, Professor Sunstein makes clear that where a
regulation’s monetized benefits are less than monetized costs, it “will not be easy to
establish” that the benefits justify the costs. 313
According to Professor Heinzerling, during her tenure at EPA, this meant not
only that OIRA would prevent rules from going forward if their monetized benefits
did not exceed their monetized costs, but that OIRA’s push for formality permeated
the culture at the EPA. In Professor Heinzerling’s words, “OIRA’s fine cost-benefit
sieve leads EPA personnel to be deeply wary of developing rules that have very high
costs in relation to their quantified and monetized benefits.” 314

(calling executive order requirements that “benefits of rules justify the costs and that the
agency has selected the approach that maximizes net benefits . . . exceedingly important”
(citations omitted)).
311
Sunstein, Myths & Realities, supra note 310, at 1865–66; see also Sunstein, Real
World, supra note 310, at 180–81 (noting that where a regulation’s monetized benefits are
less than monetized costs, “the agency is unlikely to attempt to go forward with this
regulation,” and if it does, it “will not be easy to establish” that the benefits justify the costs);
id. at 188 (observing that if an agency were to express monetized benefits in wide ranges,
“[a] great deal of work would be done to try to achieve greater precision and confidence in
the numbers”).
312
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 161 (2013). Compare
this to Professor Sunstein’s description of the proper role of CBA in his 2002 book, The
Cost-Benefit State, quoted in Part III.A above. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
313
Sunstein, Real World, supra note 310, at 180–81.
314
Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 352
(2014); see also Sunstein, Real World, supra note 310, at 180–81 (noting that where a
regulation’s monetized benefits are less than monetized costs, “the agency is unlikely to
attempt to go forward with this regulation”); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing
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There is also, perhaps, a simple institutional dynamic that contributes to the
executive branch’s pull toward formality. OIRA’s staff is made up primarily of
economists, who by their training are probably more likely to favor formal CBA,
with its explicit grounding in economic theory. 315 As noted in Part III.A, of the
literature advocating for CBA, much of that urging a more formal view of CBA
comes from formally trained economists. 316 Thus, OIRA’s professional culture and
institutional makeup may be one of the drivers of the push toward formality in the
executive branch.
Alternatively, the EPA’s move toward formality in this case may simply be the
inevitable consequence of what Professor Doug Kysar has called the “cognitive
lure” of CBA—the irresistible temptation that bureaucrats and policymakers feel to
justify their decisions with numbers that project an aura of scientific objectivity and
accuracy. 317 Or, as Kysar puts it, “the promise of an ‘objective’ quantitative analysis
seem[s] difficult to resist in the face of a heavily politicized, deeply uncertain, and
morally fraught decision.” 318
Professor Wendy Wagner made a similar argument in her case study of the
CBA accompanying the EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule. Professor Wagner argued
that in this rulemaking, CBA served not as a decisionmaking tool, but rather as a
strategic advocacy document “to help insulate the agency from inevitable legal and
political attack.” 319 If, from the agency’s perspective, defense and justification of
their chosen rule is the goal, then it is easy to see how formality, or at least the
appearance of formality, would appear to be the best strategy. 320 Numbers convey

Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 243–44
(2012) (discussing dynamic set up by centralized review of agency rules by OIRA, as giving
OIRA significant power and sway over agency rule making).
315
See Steinzor, supra note 314, at 276, 283.
316
See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text.
317
Kysar, Fish Tales, supra note 272, at 190, 197.
318
Id.; see also Cole, supra note 35, at 69 (observing that “government increasingly
rel[ies] on [CBA] as a tool in policymaking” despite its “various subjective and manipulable
elements” in part because it “appear[s] more scientific,” and because it allows “decision
makers . . . [to] boil down fundamental questions of regulatory policy to a single number (or
a set of numbers . . . ), which creates the impression (or misimpression) that the policy choice
is . . . clear”).
319
Wagner, supra note 122, at 57; see also Coates IV, supra note 9, at 91–92 (stating
agencies may use CBA strategically); Alan J. Krupnick, The CAMR: An Economist’s
Perspective, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 142 (“When
an RIA is issued contemporaneously with the rule itself, . . . the RIA becomes mere
justification for the agency’s choices rather than a means of informing and improving the
ultimate choice.”); THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF
OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 194 (1995).
320
See Coates IV, supra note 9, at 75 (noting that the SEC acted rationally in making
CBA purposely opaque, using it to camouflage their real reasoning in order to defeat future
court challenges); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 132, at 47–53 (demonstrating that when
an agency has good quantifiable data on a rule’s benefits—as the EPA does on the health
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an aura of scientific accuracy and objectivity that qualitative descriptions cannot
match. 321 Similarly, formality might serve to insulate the White House and OIRA
from charges of political meddling in agency decisionmaking. If OIRA can point to
the numbers in a formal CBA as a reason for pushing an agency to change a proposed
rule, OIRA’s role may appear less political and more scientific or technical. 322
It may be that this “cognitive lure” is in part also fueled by the adversarial
dynamics that inevitably play out between industry and environmentalists,
especially with respect to high-profile rules like this one. In earlier work I have
suggested that these dynamics take the form of “an ongoing tug-of-war between
environmentalists and industry in which each side will progressively force [the
agency] to spend more and more money seeking the holy grail of accuracy in the
quantification of costs and benefits.” 323 I argued that advocates on both sides would
face incentives to push for increased formality in CBA:
Though [the agency] may start by performing rough apples-to-oranges
comparisons in order to avoid quantifying benefits, a determination to
[regulate more or less stringently] based on such an analysis will inevitably
lead the disappointed constituency to sue claiming that benefits should
have been quantified to ensure an objective and accurate cost-benefit
analysis. Ultimately, unless [the agency] takes a stand in favor of
[informality] . . . and . . . is backed up by the courts, this political dynamic
will lead ineluctably to a more and more quantitative, complicated, and
costly analysis. 324
One might cite as a counterexample industry’s recent arguments urging the
EPA to drop the stated preference survey for its cooling water intake rule in the wake
of results suggesting huge willingness-to-pay values for protecting aquatic life. But
industry did not in that context urge the EPA to abandon formality per se. Rather,
this argument represents a disagreement about which methods of formality to use,
disagreements that are only likely to proliferate as formality increases and analysts
turn with more frequency to controversial and contestable methods like contingent

effects of particulate matter pollution—it might view formal CBA as a way to defend a
stringent rule: that certain air quality standards under the Clean Air Act would be more
stringent if set by formal CBA rather than health-based criteria).
321
See supra note 309 and accompanying text. But see Charles Gowan et al., The Role
of Ecosystem Valuation in Environmental Decision Making: Hydropower Relicensing and
Dam Removal on the Elwha River, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 508 (2006) (providing an
empirical study of a dam removal decision suggesting that decision makers and stakeholders
prefer qualitative projections as the basis for negotiation and decision making and tend to
ignore monetized valuations).
322
See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1168–70 (2014).
323
Sinden, Endangered Species, supra note 2, at 183.
324
Id. (citations omitted).
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valuation. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the environmentalists, who
generally oppose formality, found themselves in the position of arguing in favor of
the EPA’s stated-preference survey because it appeared likely to produce results that
would support more stringent regulation. 325 In this way, environmentalists’ usual
opposition to formal varieties of CBA may often be neutralized in specific cases.
A thorough understanding of the forces driving the executive branch’s apparent
tilt toward formality is largely beyond the scope of this Article. It may, however,
reflect an attempt to achieve efficiency, a belief that formality will increase
transparency, the institutional dynamics between the EPA and OIRA, the adversarial
dynamics between industry and environmentalists, or perhaps simply the “cognitive
lure” of formality.
VI. LESSONS FOR THE LARGER DEBATE
The foregoing analysis of the distinctions between formal and informal CBA
provides some lessons for the larger debate over CBA. The first lesson is about
doctrine: if we view CBA as a monolithic concept, then we risk misinterpreting those
cases and statutes that do endorse agency use of CBA as ratifying all forms of CBA,
no matter how formal. But that’s a highly misleading reading of the law. The second
lesson is about the broader debate: failing to carefully distinguish between formal
and informal forms of CBA gives the proponents of CBA the ability to facilely use
Ben Franklin as a shield in a way that muddies the debate and deflects attention from
the pitfalls and dangers of formality. The third lesson is about function: different
forms of CBA perform different functions in the decisionmaking process. Failing to
differentiate among levels of formality in CBA leads to sloppiness and confusion
about the function that CBA serves. The fourth lesson is about analytic integrity:
carefully distinguishing among different forms of CBA helps to avoid the
intellectual sloppiness and false formality that can occur when the CBA analyst tries
to combine inconsistent positions along the three axes of formality. Each of these
lessons is detailed in turn below.
A. Doctrine
If we’re not careful to define terms and we lump all forms of CBA together into
one category, then we risk misinterpreting the law. Viewing CBA as a monolith
leads to a reading of Riverkeeper as endorsing agency use of all forms of CBA,
including highly formalized versions. Indeed, that appears to be how the EPA is
interpreting the case. But that’s a highly inaccurate reading. As detailed above, the
vast majority of circuit court opinions upholding agency uses of CBA prior to
Riverkeeper also endorsed only relatively informal varieties of CBA, and a number
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See Logan, supra note 277, at 34 (noting that “[e]nvironmentalists generally support
[stated-preference] surveys, saying they account for benefits that are often ignored or ‘zeroed
out’ in cost-benefit reviews”).
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of courts have expressed considerable skepticism about formal CBA, similar to that
voiced by the Supreme Court in Riverkeeper. Accordingly, it is far more accurate to
characterize the body of federal environmental statutory and case law as generally
disfavoring CBA, but favoring decidedly informal varieties of CBA in those
relatively rare instances when its use is sanctioned. With only a few exceptions, both
Congress and the federal courts have adopted this view, expressing considerable
skepticism about more formal versions of CBA.
B. Debate
Treating CBA as a monolith also allows proponents of CBA to use Ben
Franklin as a shield—that is, to equate all forms of CBA with rationality,
reasonableness, and common sense. Yet, as the above analysis has shown, informal,
Ben Franklin-style CBA has very little in common with formal Economic CBA. For
one thing, Ben Franklin CBA involves no conversion of nonmarket values into
monetary terms, which is the source of most of the controversy that surrounds formal
Economic CBA. Additionally, these two forms of CBA perform very different
functions in decisionmaking. Informal Ben Franklin CBA is a secondary check or
litmus test applied after a particular regulatory option has already been chosen by
other means. Formal Economic CBA, on the other hand, is a decisionmaking
standard that selects the efficient regulatory alternative from a whole range of
options.
While there may be compelling arguments in favor of formal Economic CBA
as a decisionmaking tool, they do not include appeals to Ben Franklin and simple
homespun common sense. Rather, they require complex explications of economic
theory (or broader theories of welfare and well-being). 326 If participants on both
sides of the debate are more careful about recognizing the distinctions between
formal and informal varieties of CBA, then facile, but ultimately unhelpful, allusions
to Ben Franklin can be taken off the table.
C. Function
As mentioned above, different kinds of CBA perform significantly different
functions in the decisionmaking process. This aspect of the formality-informality
spectrum arises out of Axis 3 (number of alternatives). As one moves to the right on
Axis 3, CBA shifts from a secondary filter applied to a single alternative (or a small
number of alternatives) chosen by other means to an actual standard setting tool that
identifies the efficient (welfare maximizing) alternative. This is a crucial distinction,
and failing to recognize it leads to muddled thinking. 327 The most common error is
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See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 1–25.
In its proposed cooling water intake structure rule on remand, the EPA appears to
have treated CBA as a secondary check. Even though it purported to evaluate the costs and
benefits of four different options, it only did a comprehensive balancing of costs against
327
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assuming a regulation that passes a litmus-test CBA is therefore optimally efficient.
This is not the case, as Part II explains.
D. Analytic Integrity
Breaking the CBA formality spectrum down into three axes, as the typology in
Part II does, allows us to see the relationships between them. As a matter of simple
logic, certain moves along one axis generally require corresponding moves along
the other axes. Thus, if a CBA is at the informal end of Axis 1—describing costs
and benefits in purely qualitative terms—it cannot possibly move even to the middle
position on Axis 2. That is, it cannot balance costs and benefits with precision.
Similarly, if a CBA is at the informal end of Axis 3—measuring the costs and
benefits of only a single alternative—it cannot possibly move all the way to
formality on Axis 2, identifying the point of equivalence between marginal benefits
and costs.
Confusion or sloppiness about these relationships between axes leads to
intellectual incoherence and sometimes to a particular brand of incoherence I have
dubbed false formality. An example of this false formality can be found in the EPA’s
CBA of its cooling water intake rule in the lead up to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Riverkeeper. This CBA was on the informal end of Axis 1, monetizing most costs
but only a small portion of benefits, leaving most benefits unquantified and
unmonetized. This, of course, necessitated staying toward the left side of Axis 2,
performing only a rough apples-to-oranges balancing. Instead, though, when the
time came for balancing, the EPA treated the analysis as though it were formal—
performing a precise comparison of two single numbers, without mentioning the fact
that the lower number was vastly incomplete. 328 But this was, of course,
nonsensical—the direct opposite of the rationality and common sense to which
CBA’s supporters lay claim. And it arose from a failure to pay close attention to
where the CBA fell on the formality-informality spectrum and a failure to respect
the relationships between the axes of formality.
There are other examples of this false formality in which the Agency, in
Professor Wendy Wagner’s words, exhibits an “obsession with the precise

benefits (quantified and unquantified) for the preferred option. See Proposed Existing
Facilities Rule Post-Remand, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174, 22,267–68 (proposed Apr. 20, 2011) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 125). This balancing yielded the conclusion that the benefits
of the preferred option justified its costs. Id. But it could well be that benefits also justified
costs for the other options as well. Indeed, after the preliminary results of the statedpreference survey came in, economist Frank Ackerman’s calculations suggested that net
benefits would actually be higher for the more stringent options. See Comments from Frank
Ackerman, supra note 266, at 1, 11.
328
The EPA’s guidelines facilitate this by requiring the analyst to calculate net benefits
even where important benefits cannot be quantified. GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 11-3; see
supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text.
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quantification of a subset of benefits.” 329 Professor Wagner had this to say, for
example, about the CBA that the EPA conducted in connection with its 2005 Clean
Air Interstate Rule:
[I]f EPA cannot even be sure it has quantified the bulk of the benefits,
subsequent monetization of the remaining quantified benefits becomes
practically useless. If (x + y) = social benefits, and y is unknown but is
potentially large and perhaps even greater than x, then excessive efforts at
monetization of x is not going to move the ball forward in finding the
efficient balance point where marginal benefits meet marginal costs. This
is not meant to suggest that the appropriate remedy is for EPA to simply
put more resources into quantification of y, . . . however. EPA persuasively
made a case that the ecological benefits were so difficult to predict, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, that any estimation would amount to an
unverifiable guess. The appropriate response to these quantitative
problems is to acknowledge them and abort efforts to arrive at aggregate,
monetized costs and benefits.
Indeed, to nevertheless persist with incomplete quantification in such
circumstances is . . . analytically corrupt . . . . 330
This kind of false formality, or analytic corruption, results in part from a lack of
clarity about the distinctions between formal and informal varieties of CBA and the
relationships between the three axes of the formality-informality spectrum. Clarity
about where a particular CBA falls along each of the three axes and about the
relationships between those axes would go a long way toward preventing the kind
of false formality that occurred in the first iteration of the cooling water rule and that
Professor Wagner identified in connection with the Clean Air Interstate Rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the now decades-long debate over the use of CBA in agency rulemaking, the
participants have often failed to define the term. “Cost-benefit analysis” can refer to
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Wagner, supra note 122, at 66; see also Coates IV, supra note 9, at 52–53 (criticizing
the D.C. Circuit for insisting that the SEC quantify a small subset of costs where larger costs
and all benefits cannot be quantified in any case); Keohane, supra note 72, at 47 (calling the
EPA’s CBA for the Clean Air Interstate Rule “almost compulsive in its precision—as
illustrated by its patient exploration of categories of impacts . . . that do not even amount to
rounding error, being measured in the tens of millions relative to total benefits in the tens of
billions”); O’Neill, supra note 53, at 119 (calling the CBA of the EPA’s 2005 Clean Air
Mercury Rule “a complete cost-incomplete benefit analysis”).
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Wagner, supra note 122, at 65; see also Keohane, supra note 72, at 49 (“In a sterling
example of mistaking precision for accuracy, the CAIR RIA presents results to three
significant digits without regard to the considerable error bounds surrounding its
estimates.”).
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a variety of different practices that span a large spectrum, from informal Ben
Franklin CBA to formal Economic CBA. In the preceding pages I have constructed
a typology of formality in CBA, which arranges the variety of forms of CBA along
three axes in order to clarify the distinctions between and relationships among them.
I hope that this typology helps to show why failing to distinguish between formal
and informal CBA and the many varieties in between, leads to muddled thinking and
to misuses of CBA.
I have also shown that when we examine the academic debate as well as the
law concerning CBA with an ear tuned to these distinctions, several important points
emerge. First, in the academic debate, those who oppose CBA tend to paint it in very
formal terms, while those who support it are apt to paint it as less formal. This
suggests that any room for consensus is far more likely to be found at the informal
end of the spectrum. Second, the law largely seems to favor informal CBA as well.
This is true both in the body of federal environmental statutes and in the federal case
law. In light of these tendencies in the literature and the law, one might expect to see
the executive branch moving as much as possible toward the informal end of the
spectrum. Examination of executive orders, guidance documents, and a few
anecdotal examples from the EPA, however, seems to suggest a pull in the opposite
direction.
Skeptics, like myself, worry that this pull toward formality tends to diminish
rather than enhance the quality of agency decisionmaking for all the reasons that
have emerged over the years in the broader academic debate over the merits of CBA.
But the analysis here suggests additional reasons for concern. The trend toward
formality may also lead to more instances of false formality—a corruption of CBA
that can occur when agencies fail to clearly define where on the formalityinformality spectrum a particular CBA falls. Or it may lead to “futility” 331 of the
type that occurred in connection with the EPA’s latest efforts on the cooling water
rule, when their stated-preference survey provoked such controversy that, after an
investment of considerable time and resources, the Agency dropped it altogether.
Others may have different views on the desirability of formal versus informal modes
of CBA, but before a discussion of these issues can occur, the first step is to simply
recognize the existence and significance of these distinctions.
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Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 235 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

